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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN C. DAVIS, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant : Case No 99-0060 
vs. : 
LEE RITTER, SUSAN RITTER AND : 
DARWIN C. FISHER : Priority No. 15 
Defendants and Appellees. : 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992 as amended). The matter was appropriately 
poured over to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
78-2-2(4) (1992 as amended): U.C. A. 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992 as amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court error in its finding that a valid assignment of the cause of 
action did not exist prior to the filing of the initial complaint. This issue is a question of 
fact and therefore the standard of review is that the trial court's factual findings are 
reversed only if clearly erroneous. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 
1392, (Utah 1996) (Citing Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 
1990). 
2. Did the Trial Court error in its finding that neither the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, 
nor LeRoy W. Townsend was a proper party in interest in this cause of action and, as a 
result, an assignment from LeRoy W. Townsend to Steven C. Davis could not give 
Steven C. Davis standing in this cause of action. This issue is a question of fact and 
therefore, the standard of review is that the trial court's factual findings are reversed only 
if clearly erroneous. Id. 
3. Did the Trial Court error in dismissing the cause of action pursuant to Rule 17(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without giving the Plaintiff time to substitute a real 
party in interest. This issue is a question of law and therefore, the standard of review is 
the trial court's findings are reviewed for correctness. Id. The Plaintiff did not preserve 
this issue for appeal in the Trial Court record. 
4. Did the Trial Court error in not granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This issue is a question of law 
and therefore the standard of review is that of review for correctness. Id. See also Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The Plaintiff did not preserve this 
issue for appeal in the Trial Court record. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative law in this appeal is Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which reads as follows: 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose 
benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for 
the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of 
Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in 
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been 
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, 
or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, 
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been 
commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. LeRoy Townsend Sr., as trustee of the Townsend Family Trust, invested 
$250,000.00 so that the Defendants, Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter and the Townsend 
Family Trust could start a multi-level, aloe vera business. (R 421-422) (See Transcript 
page 6, line 4-12, pagel7, line 19-29, page 18, line 1-24) (Plaintiffs Memorandum 
Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 8-11). The company was started, 
software and hardware were purchased, inventory was purchased, employees were hired 
and the company started business. (See Transcript page 18, line 3-10). Over a period of 
time, the company ran out of funds and was closed. (See Transcript page 18, line 3-24). 
Mr. Townsend Sr. assigned his rights, in this cause of action, to the Plaintiff, Steven C. 
Davis. (R 363-365). Mr. Davis brought this cause of action to recover the $250,000.00 
paid by the Townsend Family Trust. (R 1-7). 
A Complaint was filed on August 13, 1993 by the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, 
against the Defendants, Lee Ritter, Susan Ritter and Darwin C. Fisher. (R i-7). A 
Default Judgment was entered on January 4, 1994, (R 25-26) and Set Aside on February 
25, 1994. (R 53-54). Various court proceedings ensued (R 55-120) and an Answer was 
filed on September 17, 1997. (R 121-124). On December 7, 1998, this matter came up 
for hearing before the Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment against the Defendants Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter and on Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss. (R 409-410). 
The Trial Court found that neither Steven C. Davis nor LeRoy W. Townsend Sr. 
was the proper party in interest in this cause of action and that at the time the cause of 
action was filed, a valid assignment of the cause of action did not exist. As a result, the 
Trial Court dismissed the cause of action without prejudice and did not rule on the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement. (R 452-453). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In December of 1991, Mr. LeRoy Townsend, Sr., as trustee of the Townsend 
Family Trust, agree to invest $250,000.00 in a venture to form a multi-level, aloe vera, 
business with the Defendants, Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter. (R 421-422) (See Transcript 
page 6, line 4-12, pagel7, line 19-29, page 18, line 1-24) (Plaintiffs Memorandum 
Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 8-11). Mr. Townsend, as trustee of 
the Townsend Family Trust, gave Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter a check, from the 
Townsend Family Trust, in exchange for 40 percent ownership of the new venture. 
(Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 8-11). Mr. 
Townsend received a stock certificate, made out in the name of the Townsend Family 
Trust, evidencing the trust's ownership in the new venture. (Plaintiffs Memorandum 
Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 10). The new venture was 
unsuccessful and, after a short period of time, it was closed. (Transcript page 19, line 1-
24). On August 13, 1993, the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, filed a Complaint against Lee 
Ritter, Susan Ritter and Darwin Fisher. The complaint ask for, among other things, the 
return of the $250,000.00 invested in the venture by the Townsend Family Trust. (R 1-7). 
On August 30, 1993, Mr. Townsend Sr. assigned his personal rights in his cause of action 
against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter to Steven Davis. In exchange, Mr. Townsend was to 
receive one-half of the proceeds recovered from the causes of action entered into against 
Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter on his behalf. (R 363-365). After various legal arguments, 
(R 55-120) an answer was filed on September 17, 1997. (R 121-124). The Plaintiff file a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, (R 193-194) and the Defendant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, (R 362) both of which came before the Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott for oral 
argument on December 7, 1998. (R 409-410). The Trial Court found that at the time the 
Complaint was filed, Steven Davis did not have a valid assignment. (R 452-453). The 
Trial Court also found that even if Mr. Davis did have a valid assignment at the time the 
Complaint was filed, the assignment was from Mr. Townsend personally and not the 
Townsend Family Trust. (R 452-453). As a result of the Trial Courts findings of fact, the 
Trial Court dismissed the cause of action without prejudice. Since the Trial Court 
dismissed the cause of action, the Trial Court did not rule on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgement. (R 452-453). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court found the assignment LeRoy Townsend gave to Steven Davis 
assigning all of LeRoy Townsend's rights in a cause of action against Lee Ritter and 
Susan Ritter did not exist at the time Steven Davis filed his Complaint against Lee Ritter 
and Susan Ritter. (R 410, 452-453). As a result, Steven Davis was not the real party in 
interest. This findings of fact are supported by the evidence presented and are not 
clearly erroneous. 
The Trial Court also found that even if the assignment LeRoy Townsend gave to 
Steven Davis assigning all of LeRoy Townsend's rights in a cause of action against Lee 
Ritter and Susan Ritter did exist at the time Steven Davis filed his Complaint, LeRoy 
Townsend Sr. would not have been the real party in interest in this cause of action and 
therefore neither was Steven Davis. (R 410, 452-453). Again the Trial Court's findings 
of fact are supported by the evidence presented and are not clearly erroneous. 
Based on the Trial Courts finding of fact, and Utah case law, the Trial Court was 
correct in dismissing the cause of action pursuant to rule 17(a) without allowing the 
Plaintiff time to amend his complaint or introduce additional evidence. 
The Trial Court did not rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
because the Trial Courts decision to dismiss the cause of action made the Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment moot. However, the Trial Court did say that if it were to 
rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, it would have ruled against the 
Plaintiff. (Transcript page 22, line 16-24). The Trial Court's refusal to rule on the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was correct and its finding that if it were to 
rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment that it would have ruled against the 
Plaintiff was also correct. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Did the Trial Court error in its finding that a valid assignment of the cause of 
action did not exist prior to the filing of the initial complaint 
The evidence, which was before the Trial Court, clearly shows that there was not 
a valid assignment of the cause of action prior to the filing of the initial complaint. The 
Plaintiffs complaint was filed on August 13, 1993. (R 1-7). An Assignment of Right of 
Action was executed and signed by Mr. LeRoy Townsend on August 30, 1993 and 
accepted by Mr. Steven C. Davis on August 31, 1993. (R 411-413). This assignment 
assigned all of Mr. Townsend's, 
.. .rights, title, interest, claims and demands, in and to any and all causes of 
action against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter which have arisen out of the 
procurement of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) by Lee 
Ritter and Susan Ritter.... (R 413) 
As was argued at the Trial Court Hearing, the language of this Assignment of Right of 
Action clearly indicated that it is an assignment of rights which will take effect upon its 
signing and not a written verification of a prior verbal assignment. (Transcript page 12, 
line 24-25, page 13, 1-18). The Assignment of Right of Action uses language such as, 
.. .LeRoy Townsend (hereinafter assignor), hereby assigns all of his rights, 
title, and interest ...","•• .Assignee, Steven Davis, will have full place 
instead of assignor.. .1, Steven C. Davis, assignee, accept the above 
Assignment.... (Emphasis added)(R411-413) 
As you can see, the language of the assignment is clearly meant to assign a future interest 
and not to ratify a previous verbal agreement. Nowhere in the assignment is there a 
reference to a prior verbal agreement. 
The fact that the Plaintiff later received a valid assignment from Mr. Townsend 
does not relate back to the time the complaint was filed. As a result, the Plaintiff was not 
the "real party in interest." 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments Section 129 (1963) states in part, 
When an unauthorized assignment of a cause of action is ratified after suit is 
brought, the ratification will not relate back to the date of the assignment and 
support the action. See Also Read v. Buffum, 79 Call 77, 21 P 555. 
Plaintiff, when ask by the Trial Court for evidence of a verbal agreement offered 
the Affidavit of Steven C. Davis and the Affidavit of Richard C. Coxson (Transcript page 
19, line 13- 25, page 1-25). A close examination of both of these affidavits shows no 
evidence whatsoever that a verbal assignment existed at the time the complaint was filed. 
(Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 18) (R 
106-107) The Affidavit of Mr. Steven C. Davis states: 
2. Before August 13, 1993 I was present with attorney Richard C. Coxson 
when LeRoy Townsend retained the legal services of Richard C. Coxson, 
via telephone conversations. The terms and conditions were verbally 
agreed to between all parties before August 13, 1993. Mr. Townsend 
requested Mr. Coxson to proceed immediately" 
"3. A formal "Assignment of Right of Action" was signed by LeRoy 
Townsend in California on the 30th day of August, 1993. My signature was 
notarized on this same instrument on the 3rd of September, 1993. I still 
have the original document. (R 106-107) 
Plaintiff argues that this affidavit establishes that a verbal assignment was made prior to 
the filing of the complaint. All this affidavit establishes is that Mr. Townsend retained 
the legal services of Richard C. Coxson, that the terms of that representation were agreed 
to and that Mr. Coxson was to proceed immediately. 
The Affidavit of Mr. Coxson states: 
1. I was originally retained in this matter by LeRoy W. Townsend, Sr. and 
by Steven C. Davis to represent them and received a retainer fee paid by 
Mr. Townsend. I was aware of the agreement and assignment between Mr. 
Townsend and Mr. Davis, which was done for consideration. (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 18) 
Again Plaintiff argues that this affidavit establishes that a verbal assignment was made 
prior to the filing of the complaint. However, once again, all that this affidavit 
establishes is that Mr. Coxson was retained for some unknown reason to represent LeRoy 
Townsend and Steven C. Davis and that he was aware of an agreement and an assignment 
between Mr. Townsend and Mr. Davis. There is no indication whatsoever as to whether 
or not there was a verbal assignment. There is also no indication whether or not the 
assignment was made before the complaint was filed. 
Plaintiff then argues "the actions of the parties demonstrated that there was in fact 
a verbal assignment." And that Mr. Coxson would not have filed the complaint if he 
wasn't aware of a prior verbal assignment. (Appellant Brief page 17). However, what a 
party's counsel says and does must be supported by the evidence and is not evidence in 
and of itself. In Butterfield v. Okubo 21 P. 555, 556 (Cal. 1889) the Court states: 
.. .The representations of counsel, though entirely credible as far as they go, 
are nevertheless not evidence, and therefore do not suffice to establish facts 
showing fatal deficiencies... 
Plaintiff also argues that equity requires that a verbal assignment be upheld 
(Appellants Brief, page 16-18). First of all this is the first time that argument has been 
made. It was not to my knowledge made in the record and should therefore not be 
considered here. However, if the argument is considered here, this argument ignores that 
fact that the Plaintiff has presented no evidence of a verbal assignment and that the Trial 
Court found that a verbal assignment did not exist. (R452-453) 
Regardless of whether you apply a review standard of clearly erroneous or 
reviewed for correctness the Trial Court was correct in its finding that the Plaintiff has 
failed to present any credible evidence whatsoever that an assignment existed prior to 
the filing of the complaint, and therefore, the Plaintiff was not the real party in interest 
and the cause of action should have been dismissed. 
2. Did the Trial Court error in its finding that neither the Plaintiff, Steven C. 
Davis, nor LeRoy W. Townsend was a proper party in interest in this cause of action 
and, as a result, an assignment from LeRoy W. Townsend to Steven C. Davis could 
not give Steven C. Davis standing in this cause of action. 
In order for Mr. Davis to be able to bring this cause of action and be considered 
the real party in interest, he must have a valid assignment from someone that, except for 
the assignment, would have been the real party in interest. In the present case, Mr. 
Townsend as trustee of the Townsend Family Trust invested $250,000.00 of trust funds 
in a business venture. (R 420-421). As evidence of the trusts investment, the trust 
received a stock certificate in the name of the trust (R 421). Mr. Townsend even took the 
time to write a letter to Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter in which he states: 
Enclosed is our check for $250,000.00 40% of the Voting stock shares in 
full in The Ideal Nutritional Concepts Inc. (Incorporated in the state of 
Washington) This voting stock to be in the name of LeRoy Willis 
Townsend, Trustee for the Living Trust of LeRoy Willis Townsend and 
Esther Ruth Townsend recorded Oct 27, 1967 in Los Angeles County State 
of California. (Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhibit 8). 
It is clear from the evidence presented to the Trial Court that the real party in 
interest was the trust and that without a valid assignment from the trust, neither Mr. 
Townsend nor Mr. Davis can qualify as the real party in interest. The only evidence of 
any assignment, is a written assignment in which Mr. Townsend personally assigns any 
rights he may have against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter to Mr. Davis (R 411-413). 
However, nothing in that documents indicate that the trust is assigning any of its rights to 
anyone. The Complaint itself backs this up when it says: "13. Plaintiff is the assignee of 
LeRoy Townsend with regard to this cause of action."(R 3). To allow this cause of action 
to continue would be to allow the possibility that the trust at some future date could bring 
the same cause of action against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter. This is exactly the concern 
that Rule 17(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, addresses. (See Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 
758 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiff, for the first time in their brief to this Court, argues that the assignment is 
valid from the trust itself. As a result, this argument should not be considered. However, 
if it is considered, it is not convincing. The Plaintiff argues that case law does not 
invalidate a document because it is signed by a trustee who does not so identify himself 
as the trustee. (Appellant's brief, page 18-20). To support his argument Plaintiff sites 
Pride Exploration v. Marshall Exploration, 798 F. 2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1986). However, 
this case deal with a completely difference issue. In this case, the document that was 
being signed was in all other respects except for the identification of the signer as the 
trustee a trust document that referred to the trust. Therefore, the only thing that was not 
correct was the fact that the signer did not identify himself as the trustee. As the Plaintiff 
quoted in his brief, the Court states: 
Surprisingly, we have discovered virtually no case law, including Texas 
cases dealing with the question of whether a conveyance properly naming 
the grantor and signed by the proper party, is nevertheless invalid because 
the signer failed to indicate the capacity in which he signed. 
The Court clearly indicates that the documents in all other respects indicated that it was a 
document transferring trust interest. In this case, the assignment does not indicate that it 
is a transfer of rights of the trust but rather a transfer of Mr. Townsend's personal rights. 
(R 411-413) The fact that Mr. Townsend did not sign the assignment as trustee is just 
another indication that it was not an assignment from the trust. 
Once again, the Trial Court was correct in its determination that even if the 
assignment was valid, it was an assignment of Mr. Townsend's personal rights and not an 
assignment of the trust's rights. (R 452-453) As a result, Mr. Davis could not be the real 
party in interest because, his assignment if considered valid was from Mr. Townsend and 
Mr. Townsend was not a real party in interest, the trust was. Whether the standard of 
review is clearly erroneous or reviewed for correctness, the Plaintiff presented not 
evidence in the record, which would allow the Trial Court to come to any other 
conclusion than it did when it found that the trust was the real party in interest and that 
the trust had not assigned its rights to anyone. Therefor the cause of action should be 
dismissed. 
3. Did the Trial Court error in dismissing the cause of action pursuant to Rule 
17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without giving the Plaintiff time to 
substitute a real party in interest. 
The Plaintiff made no arguments before the Trial Court with regard to this issue. 
The Plaintiff did not file a response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that address 
this issue and did not even raise this issue in the Plaintiffs docketing statement. 
Therefore, the Court should not address this argument. However, if the Court does 
consider this argument, given the evidence present in the record and the finding of the 
Trial Court with regard to that evidence, the Trial Court was correct in dismissing the 
cause of action pursuant to Rule 17(a) which in part states: 
(a) ... Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express 
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the 
benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's 
name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and 
when a statute so provides an action for the use or benefit of another shall 
be brought in the name of the state of Utah.... 
The uncontradicted evidence that was before the Trial Court clearly indicated, that 
the Trial Court was correct in dismissing the cause of action because the cause of action 
was not brought by the real party in interest. The Plaintiff, again for the first time in his 
brief, argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion by not allowing the Plaintiff to 
amend his complaint. (Appellant's Brief page 21-22) First of all, the Court should not 
even consider this argument because the plaintiff presents it for the first time in his brief 
to this Court. However, if the Court does consider the Plaintiff argument, the Court must 
still find that the Trial Court acted correctly. Plaintiff argues that Rule 17(a) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure requires such action. (Appellant's Brief page 21-22). Rule 17(a) says 
in part: 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder 
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
Plaintiff argues that the language quoted above applies to this case, (Appellant's 
Brief page 20-22). It does not. This Court has ruled that in a case, such as this, where the 
plaintiff is not only not the real party in interest but, has no right whatsoever to bring the 
cause of action in the first place, that the complaint initiating the cause of action is a 
nullity and there is no remaining cause of action in which to substitute parties. In Estate 
of Martin Haro v. Maria Guadalupe Haro 887 P.2d 878 (C. App Utah). This Court stated 
referring to Rule 17(a) 
This rule contemplates that the party bringing suit has the capacity to sue 
on behalf of the "real party in interest." If the suit is brought by a party that 
does not have the capacity to sue on behalf of the "real party in interest," 
the suit is a nullity. 
In this particular case, the Estate of Martin Haro had brought an action under Utah's 
wrongful death statute. The defendant brought a motion to dismiss arguing that only an 
heir or a personal representative could maintain a wrongful death action in Utah. The 
plaintiff then filed a motion to substitute the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure. In upholding the Trial Court's determination that 
because the "Estate of Martin Haro was not an heir or personal representative it did not 
have the capacity to sue and therefore the complaint and in that case the amended 
complaint were nullities the Court states: 
Section 78-11-7 clearly delineates that the decedent's heirs or his or her 
personal representative (on behalf of the heirs) are the only parties that may 
maintain an action for wrongful death. Section 78-11-7 does not allow for 
the decedent's estate to bring and maintain a wrongful death action. We 
therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff 
in the present case lacked the necessary capacity to sue. 
The Court reasoned that because the Plaintiff lacked the necessary capacity to sue, the 
complaint and the amended complaint were a nullity and, as a result, there was nothing to 
amend. 
The same situation exists here. The only right that the Plaintiff had to bring this 
cause of action was his assertion that he had an assignment from someone who had they 
brought the cause of action themselves, would have been the real party in interest. The 
evidence shows, and the Trial Court found, that this was not the case. As a result, the 
Plaintiff "had no capacity to bring an action, the complaint was a nullity and there 
remained no cause of action in which to substitute parties." 
Plaintiff further argues that Intermountain Physical Medicine Associates, v. Micro-Dex 
Corporation, 739 P.2d 1131 supports its position. (Appellant's Brief page 21-22) It does 
not. In that case the Trial Court found that: 
.. .plaintiff is a partnership made up of three P.C's, not named as parties to 
the suit, and that the three general partner-corporations are indispensable 
parties.... 
This Court goes on to state: 
The thrust of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 is to require the joinder of persons needed 
for just adjudication. Rule 19(a) instructs the trial court to join as a party a 
person whose absence will prevent complete relief amount those already 
parties. A plain reading of Rules 17(a) and 19(a) reveals that the trial court 
should make every effort to insure that the proceeding adjudicates that 
rights of those necessary and intended to be before the court 
In that case the complaint had been filed by individuals who were proper parties in 
interest. The court determined that not all of the parties required were joined and when 
the Plaintiff ask for leave to join additional parties the Trial Court refused and dismissed 
the case. In this case, the Plaintiff was not the proper party in interest and had no right to 
bring this cause of action. Because the Plaintiff was relying on assignments what were 
not valid at the time the complaint was filed, he had no rights at all and the complaint was 
a nullity. Therefore, the case was properly dismissed. The standard of review with 
regard to the Trial Court's dismissal is one of review for correctness. The Trial Court 
was clearly correct in its finding that the cause of action should have been dismissed and 
that the Plaintiff had no right to addition time to amend his complaint, even if he had 
made such a motion which he did not. 
4. Did the Trial Court error in not granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
First of all, this Court has nothing to review with regard to the issue of Summary 
Judgment because the Trial Court did not grant or deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Trial Court was correct in not considering Plaintiffs motion for 
Summary Judgment because the Trial Court granted Defendants Motion to Dismiss. By 
Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was 
moot, as the Trial Court indicated. Secondly, if the Court finds that the Trial Court was 
wrong in dismissing this cause of action, then this Court should remand this cause of 
action back to the Trial Court for further consideration, which might, depending on the 
facts and circumstances, include a consideration of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. However, if this Court does consider Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it should not grant it because this case is based completely on factual 
situations and it is clear from the record that the real issues in this case are the facts and 
the interpretation of those facts. The only things that have happened in this case with 
regard to the determination of factual issues are that the Plaintiff filed a complaint. The 
Defendant answered that complaint by denying most if not all of the factual allegations. 
The Plaintiff sent out Interrogatories, which the Defendant answered. However, those 
Interrogatories do not resolve any, much less all of the outstanding issues of fact. In 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff simply alleges facts that are still 
in dispute, draws unsupported conclusions from those facts and then asks the Trial Court 
to find that there are no factual issues in dispute. That is simply not true. In order for the 
Court to find in favor of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non moving party, in this case the 
Defendant and then the Court must find that there are no material issues of fact in 
dispute. That is simply not the case here and the Court should deny the Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Trial Court rightfully found that the evidence presented clearly 
showed that there was no verbal assignment at the time that the complaint was filed. The 
Trial Court further found that although there was a written assignment made after the 
complaint was filed, it was an assignment of Mr. Townsend's personal rights and not an 
assignment of the Townsend Family Trust's rights. Since the Townsend Family Trust 
was the only real party in interest in this case, neither Mr. Townsend nor Mr. Davis was a 
real parties in interest. Therefore, even if Mr. Townsend made a verbal assignment to 
Mr. Davis it would not have made Mr. Davis the real party in interest in this case. And 
even if there were a verbal assignment prior to the written assignment and prior to the 
filing of the complaint, it would not and did not make Mr. Davis a real party in interest. 
Because Mr. Davis was not a real party in interest and because he had no right to bring 
this cause of action against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter the complaint was a nullity and 
should have been dismissed without giving the Plaintiff additional time to amend. 
The Trial Court did not rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
because he dismissed the case pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which 
made the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment moot. The Trial Court was correct in 
its actions. 
The Trial Court was correct when it dismissed the cause of actions and did not 
consider the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore Appellees respectfully 
request this Court to affirm the deceision of the District Court. 
Dated this 4th day of December, 1999. 
Attorney for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
Albert John BUTTERFIELD and Angela 
Butterfield, on Behalf of Tiffany Ruth 
BUTTERFIELD, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
David OKUBO, Thomas Nickol, and Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, Defendant 
and Respondents. 
No. 880347-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 28, 1990. 
In medical malpractice action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H. 
Moffat, J., dismissed action on motion for 
summary judgment, and appeal was taken. 
The Court of Appeals, John Farr Larson, 
Senior Juvenile Judge, held that: (1) affidavit 
in opposition to motion for summary 
judgment was admissible, and (2) there was 
insufficient evidence of proximate causation. 
Affirmed. 
[1] JUDGMENT kl85.1(l) 
228kl85.1(l) 
Certificate attesting to proper service of 
affidavit in opposition to motion for summary 
judgment was to be taken at face value, and 
unsworn verbal representations of movant's 
counsel about defects in service, 
representations based in part on hearsay 
conversations with their office personnel, did 
not suffice to establish facts showing fatal 
deficiencies in service of affidavit. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
There was no evidence establishing causal 
link between physicians' treatment of infant 
and her death of sudden infant death 
syndrome. 
[6] TORTS kl5 
[2] PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 
kl8.80(8) 
299kl 8.80(8) 
Ordinarily, expert medical testimony must be 
presented in order to establish standard of care 
by which doctor's conduct is to be measured 
and that patient's injury was proximately 
caused by conduct of doctor that fell below 
that standard; furthermore, the expert 
testimony, like the standard of care which is 
its subject matter, is specific to the particular 
medical specialty or area of expertise of 
defendant. 
[3] EVIDENCE k538 
157k538 
One physician is not qualified to give 
admissible opinion on treatment provided by 
another physician, unless physician giving the 
opinion is shown to have familiarity with 
treating physician's particular area of practice. 
[4] JUDGMENT kl85.3(21) 
228kl85.3(21) 
While there was reason to question whether 
affiant physician's apparently rather eclectic 
background qualified him as an expert in all 
three of defendant physicians' fields of 
medical practice, his representations of his 
competence were not so patently unfounded or 
conclusory that his opinion concerning 
standard of care could be wholly disregarded 
on motion for summary judgment. 
[5] PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 
kl8.80(5) 
299kl 8.80(5) 
379kl5 
Element of proximate causation in tort case 
inquires into whether defendant could, under 
the circumstances, reasonably have foreseen 
that harm of which plaintiff complains could 
result from defendant's breach of standard of 
care. 
*94 David Grindstaff (argued), Quintana & 
Grindstaff, Attorneys for Appellants Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
David W. Slagle (argued), Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross 
Jordan Valley Hosp. 
Gary D. Stott, Michael A. Peterson, Curtis 
Drake (argued), Richards, Brandt, Miller & 
Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Thomas Nickol. 
R. Scott Williams (argued), G. Eric Nielson, 
Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for David 
Okubo. 
Before DAVIDSON, JACKSON, and 
LARSON [FN1], JJ. 
FN1. John Fair Larson, Senior 
Juvenile Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
*95 OPINION 
JOHN FARR LARSON, Senior Juvenile 
Judge: 
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal from a 
summary judgment dismissing this action for 
wrongful death, which they allege to be due to 
medical malpractice by the defendants. 
Because of a lack of evidence in the record 
concerning proximate cause, we affirm. 
After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields sued 
Drs. Nickol and Okubo and Holy Cross (but 
not Dr. McClellan) for medical malpractice, 
filing their complaint on December 15,1986. 
On August 25, 1987, the district court held a 
scheduling conference, after which an order 
issued stating that "All discovery must be 
completed, including the filing of 
depositions^] by December 11, 1987." On 
December 11,1987, the Butterfields moved to 
The Butterfields' infant daughter Tiffany died 
at home on December 20, 1984 of sudden 
infant death syndrome. She was born June 30, 
1984. On that day and again on July 16,1984, 
Tiffany was examined by Dr. David Okubo, a 
pediatrician. On two occasions in July and 
August 1984, the Butterfields noted apparent 
problems in Tiffany's breathing and took her 
to the emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital ("Holy Cross"), where she 
was examined and treated by Dr. Thomas 
Nickol, an emergency room physician and 
general practitioner. Thereafter, the 
Butterfields placed Tiffany exclusively in the 
care and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a 
family practitioner. He examined Tiffany on 
five occasions in August through 
mid-December, 1984. 
Following his August 16,1984 examination, 
Dr. Nickol recommended close observation of 
Tiffany's breathing with attention to possible 
cyanosis or blue discoloration. However, 
neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor Holy Cross 
referred the Butterfields to a physician with 
more extensive expertise specifically in infant 
breathing disorders. They also did not 
recommend the use of home apnea monitoring 
equipment. The record does not indicate 
what, if any, care or treatment was provided 
by Dr. McClellan for Tiffany's breathing 
problems during the last four months of her 
life. 
extend the discovery deadline in relation to 
Holy Cross, and on December 23, 1987, in 
relation to Dr. Nickol. On December 10 and 
11, 1987, the defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment accompanied by affidavits 
stating in essence that the defendants' 
treatment of Tiffany had not fallen below the 
applicable standard of care and was not the 
cause of her death. The court heard those 
motions on December 23, 1987. The 
Butterfields had no expert testimony in the 
record in their favor until the day before the 
summary judgment hearing, when they filed 
an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry Jacobs. They 
attempted service of the Jacobs affidavit on 
opposing counsel that evening and/or the next 
day. The copy intended for Dr. Nickol's 
counsel was left with a security guard 
employed at the office building at which 
counsel works, and Dr. Okubo's counsel could 
not locate any served copy until after the 
summary judgment hearing. 
The trial court noted the apparent defects in 
service of the Jacobs affidavit, and seems to 
have concluded that, with or without the 
Jacobs affidavit, the Butterfields had failed to 
establish a prima facie case because no 
competent expert testimony indicated either a 
breach of the standard of care or that the 
defendants1 medical treatment proximately 
caused the child's death. The principal [FN2] 
issues presented are therefore (*96 1) whether 
the Jacobs affidavit is entitled to consideration 
in ruling on the motion, and (2) whether there 
is sufficient evidence in the record to create a 
factual issue about whether the defendants 
both breached the standard of care applicable 
to each and thereby proximately caused 
Tiffany's death. 
FN2. The Butterfields also argue that 
the district court should have granted 
their motion to extend the time limit 
for completion of discovery. However, 
we find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's scheduling of the case. 
See Utah R.Civ.P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice U 16.22 at 
16-123 (2d ed. 1989). Moreover, 
FN4. Briefly, to recover for medical 
malpractice, the plaintiff must show 
that he or she suffered an injury that 
was actually and proximately caused 
by an act or omission of the medical 
professional that fell below the 
since the case was properly dismissed 
on summary judgment, additional time 
for discovery would serve no purpose. 
The Butterfields were not entitled to 
delay the summary judgment because 
they failed to proceed under Utah R. 
Civ.P. 56(f). See Cox v. Winters, 678 
P.2d311,314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. 
Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 
636, 639 (Utah Ct.App.1988); 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 
740 P.2d 275,278-79 (Utah Ct.1987). 
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit 
As courts have often noted, a party opposing 
a motion for summary judgment that is 
supported by affidavits and/or other 
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or ... otherwise ... 
must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him." [FN3] In this 
case, therefore, the Butterfields had to 
introduce evidence supporting those elements 
[FN4] of their case that had been effectively 
challenged by the defendants in moving for 
summary judgment. A major part of the 
Butterfields' evidence was the Jacobs 
affidavit. 
FN3. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); Busch 
Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); 
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. 
Co., 659 P.2d 1040,1044 (Utah 1983). 
standard of care for that professional's 
medical field or specialty. See 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah 
App.1987); Hoopiiana v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 
P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987). 
The defendants argue that the Jacobs affidavit 
should not be considered because it was not 
properly served on their counsel. 
Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment must not 
merely be filed with the court; it must also be 
served on opposing counsel no later than the 
day before the hearing on the motion, [FN5] 
to allow them an opportunity to prepare for 
the hearing. We have previously noted that an 
affidavit that has not been properly served 
should not be considered, and the motion may 
be resolved without it. P & B Land, Inc. v. 
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah 
App.1988). 
FN5. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
[1] In this case, however, the facts relating to 
the lack of service were not suitably 
established. The Jacobs affidavit was 
accompanied by a certificate attesting to 
proper service. The only evidence to the 
contrary in the record is the unsworn verbal 
representations of counsel about the defects in 
service, representations based in part on 
hearsay conversations with their office 
personnel. While we have no reason to 
question the accuracy of counsel's 
representations, the Jacobs affidavit was 
nevertheless the principal feature of the 
Butterfields' opposition to the potentially 
dispositive motions for summary judgment. 
The certificate of service is entitled to be 
taken at face value, unless admissible 
FN6. An exception is made where the 
physician's error is so plain and simple 
that it is within the range of ordinary 
lay knowledge. For example, in 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1980), a surgeon left a surgical 
cutting needle inside the plaintiffs 
body, and the court held that expert 
testimony on the standard of care was 
evidence shows it to be erroneous. The 
representations of counsel, though entirely 
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not 
evidence, and therefore do not suffice to 
establish facts showing fatal deficiencies in 
the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We 
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in 
determining whether the Butterfields came 
forward with sufficient evidence to warrant 
denial of summary judgment. 
Standard of Care 
[2][3] Due to the technical and complex 
nature of a medical doctor's services, expert 
medical testimony must ordinarily [FN6] be 
presented in order to establish the standard of 
care by which the doctor's conduct is to be 
measured and that the injury was proximately 
*97 caused by conduct of the doctor that fell 
below that standard of care. Anderson v. 
Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 
(1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 
821-22 (Utah App.1988); Martin v. Mott, 744 
P.2d 337, 338 (Utah App. 1987); Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 
262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). Further, the 
expert testimony, like the standard of care 
which is its subject matter, is specific to the 
particular medical specialty or area of 
expertise of the defendant. In other words, 
one physician is not qualified to give an 
admissible opinion on the treatment provided 
by another physician, unless the physician 
giving the opinion is shown to have 
familiarity with the treating physician's 
particular area of practice. [FN7] 
not needed, in essence because 
everybody knows that a surgeon 
should not leave inside a sharp, 
foreign object used to make the 
incision. In this case, however, 
whether the defendants should have 
taken additional steps to prevent future 
apnea is a factual question not within 
the range of ordinary lay knowledge. 
FN7. Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 
245, 247-48 (Utah 1985); see also 
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822. 
[4] The expert affidavits submitted by the 
defendants in moving for summary judgment 
indicate both that the attesting expert was 
qualified to render an opinion on the standard 
of care applicable to the particular defendant 
about which he was speaking, and that the 
defendant's treatment of Tiffany did not fall 
below that standard. The question thus 
becomes whether Dr. Jacobs also indicated 
familiarity with the standards of care 
applicable to the defendants sufficient to 
warrant consideration of his opinion. In that 
regard, Dr. Jacobs stated: 
1.1 am a physician licensed in the State of 
Maryland and am a Board Certified Surgeon 
since 1974. I have past experience in 
Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in 
private practice and hospitals, including the 
Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. 
3.1 am familiar with the Standard of Care, 
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics 
and emergency room medicine, as well as 
hospital responsibility for adequate record 
keeping and availability of previous records 
during later follow up care for a related 
complaint. 
Based on those statements, there is reason to 
question whether Dr. Jacobs' apparently rather 
[5] However, while Dr. Jacobs' criticizes the 
defendants' treatment of Tiffany, he does not 
establish the requisite causal link between that 
treatment and Tiffany's death. Dr. Jacobs 
opines that the defendants' failure to prescribe 
home monitoring of Tiffany's breathing, and 
perhaps also a more generalized inattention to 
Tiffany's breathing problems, constitute 
treatment falling below the standard of care. 
However, those asserted errors occurred in 
mid-1984, whereas Tiffany died on December 
eclectic background qualifies him as an expert 
in all three of the defendants' fields of medical 
practice. However, our role is not to 
cross-examine the affidavit by conjecture; 
[FN8] rather, we take it at face value, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Butterfields, since they lost the summary 
judgment motions in the court below. [FN9] 
In that light, Dr. Jacobs' representations of his 
competence are not so patently unfounded or 
conclusory that they can be wholly 
disregarded. Because Dr. Jacobs' opinion 
concerning the standard of care contradicts 
those of the defendants' experts, it 
demonstrates the existence of a dispute of 
material fact, which precludes summary 
judgment on the question of the standard of 
care. 
FN8. See Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639 ("In 
considering a motion for summary 
judgment, it is not appropriate for a 
court to weigh the evidence or assess 
credibility[.])" 
FN9. Branam v. Provo School Dist., 
780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989); Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 
634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 299 
(Utah 1987). 
Proximate Causation 
19, 1984, four months after she had been 
placed in the care of another medical 
practitioner. The defendants argue that these 
facts, along with expert opinion, indicate that 
their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately 
cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, however, ignores 
the causation question. 
[6] The element of proximate causation in a 
tort case inquires into whether the *98 
defendant could, under the circumstances, 
reasonably have foreseen that the harm of 
which the plaintiff complains would result 
from the defendant's breach of the standard of 
care. See Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037, 
1039 (Utah 1987); Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d 240, 245-47 (Utah 
1985); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 
728-29 (Utah 1985). Without proof of 
proximate cause, the plaintiff cannot recover 
in tort. Dowell Div. of Dow Chemical U.S.A. 
v. Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., 761 P.2d 
1380,1384 (Utah 1988); Bennionv.LeGrand 
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1082-83 
(Utah 1985). 
When proximate causation was called into 
question by the defendants in moving for 
summary judgment, it was incumbent on the 
Butterfields to come forward with evidence of 
a causal link between the purported 
malpractice and the harm for which they seek 
damages. [FN10] However, there is nothing 
in the Jacobs affidavit to indicate that the 
defendants' medical treatment proximately 
caused Tiffany's death, or even caused her 
death at all. From the record, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that the defendants 
may have erred, but fortuitously, their error 
was not a cause, or a substantial enough cause, 
of Tiffany's death. [FNll] The allegation of 
causation, a critical element of the 
Butterfields' prima facie case, thus remains 
unsubstantiated. 
FN10. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 
415-16 (Utah 1990). 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff estate appeals from the trial court's dismissal of its wrongful death action. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On February 24, 1991, Martin Haro died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning he had 
sustained while staying in the home of his ex-wife, Maria Haro. On January 12, 1993, plaintiff 
brought a wrongful death action against Maria Haro and Juan Haro, claiming that their negligence 
caused Martin Haro's injuries and eventual death. On February 26, 1993, plaintiff filed an 
amended complaint naming Maria Haro and Everardo Haro as defendants. 
Defendants brought a motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint on the ground that 
Martin Haro's estate was neither an heir nor his personal representative and therefore could not 
maintain an action under Utah's wrongful death statute. Plaintiff then brought a motion to 
substitute the real parties in interest, pursuant to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court ruled that because the "Estate of Martin Haro is not an heir and did not have the 
capacity to sue, the Complaint and Amended Complaint are nullities." The trial court therefore 
granted defendants1 motion and denied plaintiffs motion with prejudice. This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Proper Plaintiff in Wrongful Death Action 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved 
2 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by ruling that it did not have the capacity to sue. 
Specifically, plaintiff argues that an estate has an interest in recovering for the decedent's wrongful 
death. We disagree. 
Utah's wrongful death statute provides that "when the death of a person not a minor is caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the 
benefit of his heirs, may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1992) (emphasis added). The underlying purpose of this statute is "to 
provide compensation to those who were dependent upon the decedent as a sole or supplemental 
means of economic and emotional support." Dennis C. Farley, Note, Decedent's Heirs Under 
the Utah Wrongful Death Act, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 77, 80. 
In In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1924), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the separate identities of a decedent's heirs and a decedent's estate under the wrongful 
death statute. * The court held that a claim for wrongful death is a 
separate and independent cause of action and is not a continuation of the right of action 
of the injured party for personal injuries. The death creates a new cause of action for the 
loss suffered by the heirs by reason of the death, and only comes into existence upon the 
happening of the death. 
Id. 213 P.2d at 660-61. The court also held that the proceeds from a wrongful death award 
may not be intermingled with the res of the estate. 
The legislature intended that the proceeds obtained from the wrongdoer would not be 
intermingled with other assets of the estate of the deceased. Otherwise, the cause of action 
would have been vested in the personal representative alone and the amount would have 
been subjected to administration by him in the same manner as other estate assets. 
Id. at 660. 
Section 78-11-7 clearly delineates that the decedent's heirs or his or her personal 
representative (on behalf of the heirs) are the only parties that may maintain an action for 
wrongful death. Section 78-11-7 does not allow for the decedent's estate to bring and maintain a 
wrongful death action. We therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that 
plaintiff in the present case lacked the necessary capacity to sue.2 
Plaintiffs Rule 17(a) Motion 
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by not allowing it to amend its complaint to 
substitute decedent's heirs as the real parties in interest pursuant to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. We disagree. 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
3 
Rule 17(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, 
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose 
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is 
brought.... 
This rule contemplates that the party bringing suit has the capacity to sue on behalf of the 
"real party in interest." If the suit is brought by a party that does not have the capacity to sue on 
behalf of the "real party in interest," the suit is a nullity. Because Martin Haro's estate had no 
capacity to bring an action for wrongful death, the complaint was a nullity and there remained no 
cause of action in which to substitute parties. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying 
plaintiffs motion to substitute real parties in interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs cause of action. Additionally, the trial court 
did not err in denying plaintiffs motion to substitute parties. 
Affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
DISPOSITION 
Affirmed. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 The 1924 version of Utah's wrongful death statute, like the current version, provided that suit could 
only be brought by decedents heirs or decedents personal representative. 
2 The trial court also ruled that plaintiff's action against Everardo Haro was not initiated within the 
two-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28 (1992). Plaintiff contends that the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death actions violates article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, which provides 
that "the right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated." In light 
of our holding that the estate is not a proper plaintiff, we need not reach plaintiffs constitutional argument. 
We note, however, that statutes of limitations do not abrogate rights to sue, but merely proscribe the time in 
which those rights must be asserted. See Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993) (statutes of 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved 
4 
limitations Ndo not abolish a substantive right to sue, but simply provide that if an action is not filed within the 
specified time, the remedy is deemed to have been waived The barring of the remedy is caused by a 
plaintiffs failure to take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action within the time afforded by statute**). 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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vs. 
Willowcreek Plaza, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 950264 
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Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable John A. Rokich. On Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
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Brian S. King, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
John Clyde Hansen, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
JUDGES 
Associate Chief Justice Stewart, Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Justice Russon concur in Chief 
Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
AUTHOR: ZIMMERMAN 
OPINION 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice : 
On a writ of certiorari, plaintiff Randi Hebertson asks us to review a court of appeals decision 
upholding a trial court's dismissal of her complaint against defendant Willowcreek Plaza. 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Ct. App.), cert granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 
1995). We affirm. 
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, "we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true 
and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs." Cruz 
v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1996) (citing Roark v. 
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Utah 1995)). "We recite the facts accordingly." Id. 
On December 31, 1988, Hebertson allegedly slipped and fell on the premises of a 
commercial building located at 8160 South Highland Drive, known as Willowcreek Plaza. 
Within three days after the alleged accident, Hebertson contacted the building manager, who 
referred her to an adjuster at State Farm Insurance. In November of 1992, approximately one 
month before the statute of limitations expired, Hebertson filed a complaint against 
"Willowcreek Plaza" and served the complaint on one of the managers of Willow Creek Plaza, 
L.C., which owned the building at the time the complaint was filed. Willow Creek Plaza, L.C., 
moved to dismiss the complaint because it did not own the building at the time of the alleged 
accident. 
At the time Hebertson allegedly fell, the building was owned by Bank One, Utah, formerly 
known as Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley Bank"), subject to an undivided eighty 
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percent interest in the property held by Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB ("Dime 
Savings"), pursuant to a participation agreement. The banks acquired title to the property after 
Willow Creek Shopping Village, Ltd., defaulted on its construction loan. Thereafter, Valley 
Bank entered into various leases with tenants at the building. On all leases, Valley Bank was 
designated as the landlord, and all leases were executed by Valley Bank and Trust Company. The 
leases variously referred to the building as "Willow Creek Shopping Village," "Willow Creek 
Plaza Executive Offices," "Willow Creek Plaza," and "Willow Creek Plaza Development." 
On the basis of these facts, the trial court dismissed the original complaint without 
prejudice.^ Hebertson then refiled her complaint under the savings statute, section 78-12-40 of 
the Utah Code, again naming Willowcreek Plaza in the caption but this time serving the 
complaint on Valley Bank and Dime Savings, naming them as defendants in the body of the 
complaint. Valley Bank and Dime Savings moved to dismiss, arguing that they could not be sued 
under the name "Willowcreek Plaza." Hebertson opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that 
Valley Bank and Dime Savings could be sued under the name "Willowcreek Plaza" because they 
were "transacting business under a common name." See Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d). Valley Bank and 
Dime Savings produced the affidavit of Brad R. Baldwin, general counsel for Valley Bank, 
asserting that "at no time . . . did Valley Bank and Dime Savings transact business as 
'Willowcreek Plaza.'" The trial court granted the banks' motion to dismiss.^ 
Hebertson appealed the dismissal to this court, and we poured the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, reasoning that there was "insufficient 
evidence that Valley Bank and Dime Savings transacted business or held themselves out to the 
public under the common name of Willowcreek Plaza. . . . 'Willowcreek Plaza' was merely 
the name given to the property . . . ." Hebertson, 895 P.2d at 841. The court of appeals 
concluded that "the mere name accorded a piece of property does not constitute doing business 
under that name for purposes of Rule 17(d)." Id. Hebertson sought review by this court, and we 
granted certiorari. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
We first identify the appropriate standard of review. "On certiorari, we review the decision of 
the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 
(Utah 1995) (citing Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992)). In reviewing the 
court of appeals' opinion, we adopt the same standard of review used by that court: "Questions of 
law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly 
erroneous." Id. (citing Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)). The 
court of appeals, after noting that Valley Bank and Dime Savings conceded that they were doing 
business together, went on to find "that the mere name accorded a piece of property does not 
constitute doing business under that name for purposes of Rule 17(d)." Hebertson, 895 P.2d at 
841. This is a conclusion of law which we review for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994). 
We begin by examining Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d), which provides, "When two or 
more persons associated in any business . . . not a corporation, transact such business under a 
common name . . . they may sue or be sued by such common name." Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d). 
Clearly the rule contemplates two factors: (i) parties transacting business, and (ii) transacting 
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such business under a common name. In this case, the parties conceded at oral argument that 
Valley Bank and Dime Savings were transacting business when they assumed title to the 
property, pursuant to a participation agreement, and entered into leases with various tenants for 
portions of the property. However, there was simply no evidence before the court suggesting that 
Valley Bank and Dime Savings ever transacted business under the name "Willowcreek Plaza." 
All evidence of business transacted by the two banks, i.e., the leases entered into with various 
tenants and the participation agreement itself, indicate that business was done in the name of 
Valley Bank and Trust Company. Even the leases themselves do not consistently refer to the 
property by the name "Willowcreek Plaza." 
We do not here articulate a test for determining when parties are transacting business under a 
common name. We simply hold that the name of a building owned by parties transacting 
business together, even if such business relates solely to that building, is not enough, without 
more, to establish that the parties were transacting business under the name of the building for 
purposes of rule 17(d). Hebertson argues to the contrary but cites no authority for her 
contentions. We have researched the question exhaustively and can find no authority on the 
point, a fact which we take as evidence for the proposition that the rule we announce is so clear it 
has never been deemed worthy of address by any appellate court. Our decision today should 
settle this hitherto unasked question for Utah. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' ruling 
upholding the trial court's dismissal of Hebertson's complaint. 
Associate Chief Justice Stewart, Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Justice Russon concur in 
Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
DISPOSITION 
Affirmed 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 Hebertson apparently opposed the motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, moved to amend the 
complaint to name Valley Bank and Dime Savings. The trial court in that action apparently dismissed the 
action because Valley Bank and Dime Savings had not been served within the 120 days provided by rule 
and, having dismissed the action, did not reach the motion to amend. Neither party to this appeal has 
provided any documentation of this first action, so we are forced to reconstruct the events, as best we can, 
from the parties' descriptions in their briefs and their statements at oral argument. Needless to say, our 
decision does not turn on any facts relating to this first action. 
2 Because Valley Bank and Dime Savings presented Baldwin's affidavit with their motion to dismiss 
and the trial court did not specifically exclude that evidence, the motion to dismiss should have been 
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b) ("If. . . matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . . ."). The parties 
conceded at oral argument before the court of appeals that the trial court's "ruling is best characterized as 
a grant of summary judgment." Hebertson v. Willowcreek, 895 P.2d 839, 840 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Neither party challenged this characterization on appeal. 
We also note that rule 12 further provides that once evidence outside the pleadings is presented, "all 
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parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). We have held that "it is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively 
demonstrate that when a motion to dismiss is made and '. . . matters outside the pleading are presented 
to and not excluded by the court . . .' that all parties . . . are given reasonable opportunity to present 
additional pertinent material if they wish." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587 
P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1975) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)). Apparently, Hebertson was never given 
additional time nor allowed any discovery which might have produced evidence that the banks were doing 
business under the common name "Willowcreek Plaza." However, nothing in the record presented to this 
court indicates that Hebertson ever asked for such time or discovery. Moreover, Hebertson failed to raise 
this issue on appeal, and we will therefore not address it. Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 956 & n.6 
(Utah 1994). 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved 
In re District Justice Bradford Clark 
TIMBERS, Lehigh County Mag-
isteria! District 31-2-03. 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 
Submitted Jan. 3, 1997. 
Decided June 16, 1997. 
0178 Judicial Administration Docket No. 
a. 1. 
ORDER 
PER CURIAM. 
AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 1997. in 
ht of the removal of District Justice Tim-
rs from office, this matter is dismissed as 
K)t. 
i KEY NUM6EP SYSTEM > 
HORBAL v. MOXHAM NAT. BANK Pa. 577 
Cite as 697 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997) 
pealed. The Superior Court, No. 1029 Pitts-
burgh 1993, 441 Pa.Super. 463, 657 A.2d 
1261, affirmed, and review was granted. 
The Supreme Court, No. 24 W.D.1996, Cas-
tille, J., by an equally divided court, held 
that CD was not personal asset of mortga-
gors on date of sheriffs sale pursuant to 
negotiable instruments provisions of Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC), and thus 
bank did not have to comply with Deficiency 
Judgment Act before liquidating CD. 
Affirmed. 
thony HORBAL and John Horbal, indi-
iduals for the use and benefit of High-
and Financial Ltd, a corporation, and 
fames R. Walsh, an individual, 
MOXHAM NATIONAL BANK, 
a corporation. 
Appeal of HIGHLAND FINANCIAL 
LTD. & James Walsh. 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 
Submitted July 8, 1996. 
Decided Julv 10, 1997. 
Assignees of mortgagors' causes of ac-
i against bank sued bank, alleging that 
k violated Deficiency Judgment Act by 
•idating certificate of deposit (CD) as-
ied to bank to secure mortgage loan, and 
applying proceeds of CD to loan balance 
r foreclosing on mortgage. The Court 
Common Pleas, Cambria County, Civil 
ision. No. 1992-735, Leahey, J., granted 
unary judgment for bank. Assignees ap-
Newman, J., filed opinion in support of 
reversal, in which Cappy and Nigro, JJ., 
joined. 
1. Execution 0=>353 
Deficiency Judgment Act applies when-
ever real property of debtor has been sold in 
execution to judgment creditor for sum less 
than amount of judgment, interest, and costs. 
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103 
2. Execution o=>353 
Under Deficiency Judgment Act, credi-
tor's judgment against debtor is reduced by 
fair market value of property purchased by 
creditor, rather than by actual sale price of 
property. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103. 
3. Execution 0=353 
Objective of Deficiency judgment Act is 
to relieve debtor from further personal liabil-
ity to judgment creditor when real property 
taken by judgment creditor on an execution 
has fair market value on date of sale suffi-
cient so that judgment creditor can dispose 
of property to others without further loss. 
(Per Castille, J., with two judges concurring.) 
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103. 
4. Mortgages 0=556 
After foreclosing on mortgage and pur-
chasing mortgaged property at sheriffs sale, 
bank was not required to proceed under De-
ficiency Judgment Act before liquidating cer-
tificate of deposit (CD), which mortgagors 
had assigned to bank as further security for 
mortgage loan, and applying proceeds of CD 
to loan balance, since Act was designed to 
protect debtor's personal assets, and CD was 
not personal asset of mortgagors on date of 
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sheriffs sale, by operation of Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC). (Per Castille. J., with 
two judges concurring.) 13 Pa.C.S.A. 
S§ 3104, 3201(a), 3301, 3302(a); §§ 3119(b), 
3305(1)119921; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103. 
5. Mortgages <2>211 
Once mortgagors assigned certificate of 
deposit (CD) to bank as security for mort-
gage loan, bank became immediately vested 
in mortgagors' rights in CD, under Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) negotiable instru-
ment provisions. (Per Castille, J., with two 
judges concurring.) 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3104, 
3201(a), 3301, 3302(a); §§ 3119(b), 3305(1) 
[1992]; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103. 
6. Bills and Notes <S=>363 
Under Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), bank became holder in due course of 
certificate of deposit (CD) assigned by mort-
gagors to bank as security for mortgage loan, 
since bank's loan constituted value and bank 
took CD without notice of it being overdue or 
subject to any defenses, and, thus, under 
terms of assignment of deposit giving bank 
absolute right to enforce payment in its own 
name upon default, CD ceased being person-
al asset of mortgagors after they defaulted 
on loan secured by CD. (Per Castille, J., 
with two judges concurring.) 13 Pa.C.S.A. 
§§ 3104, 3201(a), 3301, 3302(a); §§ 3119(b), 
3305(1) [1992]; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103. 
7. Assignments C=»31, 90 
"Assignment" is transfer of property or 
some other right from one person to another, 
and, unless in some way qualified, it extin-
guishes assignors right to performance by 
obligor and transfers that right to assignee. 
(Per Castille, J., with two judges concurring.) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
8. Assignments <^ >90 
Under lawT of assignment, assignee suc-
ceeds to no greater rights than those pos-
sessed by assignor. (Per Castille, J., with 
two judges concurring.) 
9. Assignments ^ 7 2 
Assignment will ordinarily be construed 
in accordance with rules of construction gov-
erning contracts and circumstances sur-
rounding execution of assignment document. 
(Per Castille, J., with two judges concurring.) 
10, Mortgages <s=>211 
Based on language of assignment of de-
posit and circumstances under which certifi-
cate of deposit (CD) was assigned by debtors 
to bank as security for mortgage loan, as-
signment agreement divested debtors of any 
ownership and control of CD on date of 
default and vested such rights in bank; as-
signment appointed bank as true and lawful 
attorney with all rights, title, and interest in 
CD, it gave bank power to execute and to 
withdraw CD upon default without notice or 
debtors' further consent, and it could only be 
released upon parties' agreement or upon full 
repayment of debt. (Per Castille, J., with 
two judges concurring.) 
James R. Walsh, Johnstown, for Highland 
Financial, Ltd. & James Walsh. 
Jeffrey T. Morris, Pittsburgh, for Moxham 
National Bank. 
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, 
CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and 
NEWMAN, JJ. 
ORDER 
PER CURIAM. 
The Court being evenly divided, the order 
of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
CASTILLE, J., files an Opinion in Support 
of Affirmance in which FLAHERTY, C.J., 
and ZAPPALA, J., join. 
NEWMAN, J., files an Opinion in Support 
of Reversal in which CAPPY and NIGRO, 
JJ., join. 
OPINION IN SUPPORT 
OF AFFIRMANCE 
CASTILLE, Justice. 
The issue on appeal is whether a 
bank judgment creditor who purchases the 
debtor's real property which has been 
pledged as collateral for the underlying debt 
at a sheriffs sale in a mortgage foreclosure 
action, has the right after the sheriffs sale to 
liquidate a certificate of deposit assigned to it 
HORBAL v. MOXHAM NAT. BANK 
Cite as 697 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997) 
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ecurity for the same debt without com-
fig with the provisions of the Deficiency 
^rnent Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8103, et seq. 
ause we find that the bank/judgment 
litor, under the circumstances of this 
.', did not have to comply with the Defi-
cy Judgment Act before liquidating the 
ificate of deposit, we affirm the Superior 
rt order.1 
he relevant facts giving rise to this ap-
are that on February 4. 1988, Moxham 
ional Bank ("Moxham") loaned $120,000 
ohn HorbaL Anthony Horbal and Elaine 
ms, co-partners t/a Potomac Associates 
collectively, the "Debtors"), for the acqui-
m of property at 502 Main Street in 
nstown, Pennsylvania. As collateral for 
loan, Debtors executed a mortgage on 
. property in favor of Moxham. On Feb-
"y 11, 1988, the mortgage in favor of 
cham wTas duly recorded. 
n February 18, 1988, John Horbal and 
hony Horbal, in their individual capaci-
, executed an instrument entitled Assign-
it of Deposits wiiereby they assigned a 
,000 Certificate of Deposit ("CD") to Mox-
I in order to provide additional security 
the loan because the value of the proper-
standing alone did not fully secure the 
t. The Assignment of Security, in rele-
t part, provides that: 
T]he undersigned, Anthony Horbal and 
ohn Horbal (hereinafter the called "As-
gnors"), for and in consideration of good 
nd valuable consideration in hand paid, 
ie receipt and sufficiency of all of wrhich is 
ereby acknowiedged, does hereby AS-
IGN, TRANSFER and PLEDGE to the 
loxham National Bank . .. (hereinafter 
ailed "Bank") all of Assignors' right, title 
nd interest, on Certificate of Deposit 
lumber 2005581, in the principal amount 
f Twenty Five thousand and 00/100 Dol-
*rs ($25,000) . . . (all of which is hereafter 
ailed the "Account") . . . 
Appellants raise two other issues on appeal, 
irst, appellants argue that the liquidation of the 
irtificaie of deposit without complying with the 
eficiencv Judgment Act amounted to Moxham 
ational Bank charging and collecting a usuri-
es rate of interest that would entitle them to 
ehlc damages under 41 P.S. § 502. Second. 
Ppcllants argue that if the liquidation of the 
This Assignment and security interest is 
granted to the Bank [Moxham] to secure 
the prompt and unconditional payment and 
performance wrhen due of the following (all 
of which is herein called the "Indebted-
ness"). 
Any and all indebtedness, obligations and 
liabilities of Potomac Associates II (herein-
after the "Debtors") to the Bank, now or 
hereafter existing or arising, due or to 
become due. 
Assignors hereby constitutes [sic] and ap-
points [sic] the Bank their true and lawful 
attorney, with full powrer of substitution, (i) 
to ask, demand, collect, receive, receipt for, 
sue for, compound and give acquittance for 
any and all amounts winch may be due or 
become due and payable under the Ac-
count (ii) to execute any and all withdrawal 
receipts or other orders for the payment of 
money drawii on the Account, (iii) anaVor 
to withdraw all or part of the Account 
without notice to or further consent by 
Assignors. 
Upon the complete payment of the indebt-
edness or upon the mutual agreement of 
the Assignors and the Bank, the Bank will 
release or partially release this Assign-
ment. 
If for any reason any of the indebtedness 
is not paid on or before the maturity there-
of . . . or if Assignor or Debtors shall 
default in the performance of any covenant 
or other agreement of this Assignment or 
of any other agreement now or hereinafter 
executed in connection with or as security 
for any of the indebtedness the Bank shall 
be entitled to receive or withdraw any or 
all items or all funds in the Account. 
The rights and remedies of the Bank un-
der this Assignment and any other instru-
ment or agreement executed in connection 
with or as security for any of the Indebted-
certificate of deposit amounted to charging a 
usurious rate of interest, they are entitled to 
attorney's lees under 41 P.S. § 503. Because we 
hold that the Deficiency Judgment Act does not 
apply under the facts of this case and these two 
issues depend on the Deficiency Judgment Act 
being applicable we need not address these two 
issues 
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ness shall be cumulative, and the exercise 
or partial exercise of any such right or 
remedy shall not preclude the exercise of 
any right or remedy. 
In 1989, Debtors defaulted on the $120,000 
loan obligation. On August 31, 1989, Mox-
ham initiated foreclosure proceedings against 
Debtors in the Cambria County Court of 
Common Pleas. On October 24, 1989, the 
common pleas court entered a default judg-
ment in favor of Moxham and against Debt-
ors. On September 7, 1990, the common 
pleas court issued a Writ of Execution upon 
the real property of the Debtors (502 Main 
Street) which was serving as security for the 
loan. 
On December 14, 1990, the real property 
was sold by the Cambria County Sheriff at 
sheriff sale to Moxham for $666.40. On Jan-
uary 21, 1991, the Cambria County Sheriff 
filed and delivered the deed for the real 
property to Moxham. On January 29, 1991, 
Moxham liquidated the CD and applied the 
sum of $26,437 to the Debtors' outstanding 
loan balance of approximately $116,000. 
However, Moxham failed to file a petition to 
fix the fair market value of the real property 
pursuant to the Deficiency Judgment Act. 
On November 15, 1991, John Horbal and 
Anthony Horbal assigned to Highland Finan-
cial Limited and James R. Walsh (collective-
ly, the "appellants") any rights or causes of 
action they might have by virtue of Mox-
ham's liquidation of the funds of the CD and 
the application of those funds to Debtors' 
outstanding loan balance. On November 20, 
1991, Moxham was informed of this assign-
ment. On November 27, 1991, appellants 
made a demand of Moxham to turn over the 
proceeds it realized from the liquidation of 
2. Section 502 of Title 41 provides in pertinent 
part that: 
[A] person who has paid a rate of interest for 
a loan or use of money at a rate in excess of 
that provided for by this act or otherwise by 
law or has paid charges prohibited or in excess 
of those allowed by this act or otherwise by 
law may recover triple the amount of such 
excess interest or charges in a suit at law 
against the person who has collected such ex-
cess interest or charges. 
41 P.S. § 502. 
the CD. Moxham subsequently refuse 
comply with appellants' request. 
On March 18, 1992, appellants filed a ( 
plaint against Moxham to recover the 
ceeds from the CD asserting that Mox 
failed to comply with the provisions of 
Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa. 
§ 8103(d). Appellants' complaint sought 
ble damages against Moxham for alleg 
charging a usurious rate of interest whe 
liquidated the CD, pursuant to 41 
§ 502,2 and further sought attorney fees 
prosecuting this action, pursuant to 41 
§ 503.3 At the close of discover}7, appelh 
and Moxham filed cross-motions for s 
mary judgment. On June 22, 1993, the t 
court granted summary judgment in favo 
Moxham on the grounds that the Deficie 
Judgment Act had no bearing on Moxha 
ability to liquidate the CD and to apply 
proceeds to partially satisfy the outstanci 
debt remaining after the sheriffs sale of 
real property pledged as collateral for 
debt. In reaching this conclusion, the t 
court reasoned that Moxham's right to 
CD arose out of a contract separate i 
distinct from the mortgage on the prope 
securing the loan. Moreover, the trial co 
reasoned that the rights to the CD vesi 
totally in Moxham on the date of defai 
Thus, the trial court found that the CD v 
no longer a personal asset of the Debtors 
the time that the sheriffs sale occurri 
Therefore, since the CD belonged to M< 
ham and it was not a personal asset of t 
Debtors, the trial court concluded that M< 
ham was free to liquidate the CD anytii 
after the loan default without having to co 
ply with the provisions of the Deficien 
Judgment Act. 
Appellants then appealed to the Superi 
Court. An en banc Superior Court, in a fiv 
3. Section 503(a) of Title 41 provides that: 
[I]f a borrower or debtor, including but n 
limited to a residential mortgage debtor, pi 
vails in an action under this act. he sh; 
recover the aggregate amount of costs ai 
expenses determined by the court to have bei 
reasonably incurred on his behalf in conne 
tion with the prosecution of such action, t 
gether with a reasonable amount for attorney 
fee. 
41 P.S. § 503(a). 
HORBAL v. MOXHAM NAT. BANK 
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to-four decision, affirmed the trial court.4 
On April 11, 1996, we granted allocatur to 
determine whether the Deficiency Judgment 
Act applied to situations such as those pre-
sented in this case.5 
Summary judgment may be granted only 
when it is clear from the pleadings and the 
evidence that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Marks v. Taxman, 527 Pa. 132, 134, 589 A.2d 
205, 206 (1991) (citing Pa. R.C.P. 1035(b;). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only in 
those cases which are clear and free from 
doubt. Id. A trial court's grant of summary 
judgment will not be reversed unless it is 
established that the court committed an er-
ror of law or clearly abused its discretion. 
Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 215. 666 
<L2d 245, 248 (1995). 
Sections 8103(a) and 8103(d) of the Defi-
riency Judgment Act provide as follows: 
§ 8103. Deficiency judgments 
(a) General Rule.- Whenever any real 
property is sold, directly or indirectly, to 
the judgment creditor in execution pro-
ceedings and the price for which such 
property has been sold is not sufficient to 
satisfy the amount of the judgment, inter-
est and costs and the judgment creditor 
seeks to collect the balance due on said 
judgment, interests and costs, the judg-
ment creditor shall petition the court hav-
ing jurisdiction to fix the fair market value 
of the real property sold. The petition 
shall be filed as a supplementary proceed-
Thc majority affirmed the trial court's holding 
hat the Deficiency Judgment Act did not apply 
n this case. In affirming the trial court, the 
najority found that in accordance with commer-
ial paper division of the Uniform Commercial 
ode, 13 Pa.C.S. § 3101 ct seq., Moxham became 
holder in due course of the CD. As a holder in 
ue course, the majority reasoned that Moxham 
;quircd al! of Debtor's rights in the CD upon 
cccution of the assignment documents. Thus, 
ic majorin held that Moxham was free to liqui-
iie the CD either before or after the sheriffs 
le subject only to the terms contained in the 
signment agreement. 
The four dissenting Superior Court judges bc-
•ved that the Deficiency Judgment Act applied 
this case because the assignment and mort-
ge were related in that thev both ensured pa\-
.•m ot the loan and the Assignment of the CD 
ing in the matter in which the judgment 
was entered. 
(d) Action in absence of petition.- If the 
judgment creditor shall fail to present a 
petition to fix the fair market value of the 
real property sold within the time after the 
sale of such real property as provided by 
section 5522 (relating to six months limita-
tion), the debtor, obligor, guarantor or any 
other person liable directly or indirectly to 
the judgment creditor for the payment of 
the debt, or any person interested in any 
real estate which would, except for the 
provisions of this section, be bound by the 
judgment, may file a petition, as a supple-
mentary petition in the matter in which the 
judgment was entered, in the court having 
jurisdiction, setting forth the fact of the 
sale, and that no petition has been filed 
within the time limited by statute after the 
sale to fix the fair market value of the 
property sold, whereupon the court, after 
notice as prescribed by the general rule, 
and being satisfied of such facts, shall di-
rect the clerk to mark the judgment satis-
fied, released and discharged. 
42 Pa.C.S. § 8103(a) & (d). 
[1-3] The Deficiency Judgment Act ap-
plies whenever real property of the debtor 
has been sold in execution to the judgment 
creditor for a sum less than the amount of 
the judgment, interest and costs. First Na-
tional Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 
515 Pa. 85, 95, 527 A.2d 100, 104 (1987). 
Under the Deficiency Judgment Act, the 
creditor's judgment against the debtor is re-
duced by the fair market value of the proper-
provided that it could only be redeemed to satisfy 
an existing indebtedness. Since Moxham pur-
chased the mortgaged property at a sheriff sale, 
the dissent argued that the failure to proceed in 
accordance with the provisions of the Deficiency 
Judgment Act created an irrebuttable presump-
tion that Moxham was paid in full and no further 
indebtedness existed. Thus, the dissent believed 
that since no amount was due Moxham, it had no 
right to obtain the proceeds ol the CD. 
5. Neither party disputes that Moxham could have 
liquidated the CD anytime after the Debtors de-
faulted on the loan up to the date of sheriff sale 
on the property without complying with the Defi-
ciency Judgment Act in order to set-off the out-
standing balance due. 
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ty purchased by the creditor rather than by 
the actual sale price of the property. Id. at 
96, 527 A.2d at 105. The objective of the 
Deficiency Judgment Act is to relieve a debt-
or from further personal liability to the judg-
ment creditor when the real property taken 
by the judgment creditor on an execution has 
a fair market value on the date of sale suffi-
cient so that the judgment creditor can dis-
pose of the property to others without a 
further loss. Id.; Philip Green & Son, Inc. 
v. Kimivyd, Inc., 410 Pa. 202, 205, 189 A.2d 
231, 232-33 (1963). 
[4] Here, Moxham bought the mortgaged 
property at a sheriffs sale for a price well 
under the outstanding loan balance. Under 
the terms of the Assignment of Deposit, 
Moxham's rights to the CD were created in 
order to secure Debtors' outstanding indebt-
edness and its rights to the CD only termi-
nated if the indebtedness no longer existed. 
Thus, Moxham's right to liquidate the CD 
depended on its interest in the CD on the 
date of liquidation. 
In order for any writing to qualify as a 
negotiable instrument within the Commercial 
Paper division of the Uniform Commercial 
Code ("UCC"), the writing must: 
(1) be signed by the maker or drawer; 
(2) contain an unconditional promise or or-
der to pay a sum certain in money and no 
other promise, order, obligation or power 
given by the maker or drawer, except as 
authorized by this division; 
(3) be payable on demand or at a definite 
time; and 
(4) be payable to order or bearer. 
13 Pa.CS. § 3104.* The same division of the 
UCC recognizes a certificate of deposit as a 
type of negotiable instrument, 13 Pa.C.S. 
§ 3104(b)(3), and that recognition is consis-
tent with case law within the Commonwealth. 
See Gordon v. Fifth Avenue Bank. 308 Pa. 
323, 326-27, 162 A. 825, 826 (1932) (certificate 
of deposit issued by bank in its general form 
6. As recognized by the Superior Court in this 
case, the Uniform Commercial Code Act of No-
vember 1, 1979 was applicable at all times mate-
rial to the transactions involved in this appeal. 
Thus, all references in this opinion are to that 
version of the UCC rather than the 1992 amend-
ments to the UCC. 
is a negotiable instrument). Also, the nego-
tiable character of an instrument is unaffect-
ed by a separate agreement between the 
parties. 13 Pa.C.S. § 3119(b).7 
When a negotiable instrument is trans-
ferred from one party to another, the trans-
fer of the instrument "vests in the transferee 
such rights as the transferor has therein." 
13 Pa.CS. § 3201(a). If the transferee took 
the instrument for value, in good faith, and 
without notice of the instrument being over-
due or subject to any defenses, the transfer-
ee becomes a holder in due course. 13 Pa. 
CS. § 3302(a). As a holder in due course, 
the transferee "may transfer or negotiate it 
and, except as otherwise provided in section 
3603 (relating to payment or satisfaction), 
discharge it or enforce payment in his own 
name." 13 Pa.CS. § 3301. Moreover, to the 
extent that a person is a holder in due 
course, he takes the instrument free from 
"all claims to it on the part of any person." 
13 Pa.CS. § 3305(1). As the comments to 
this section note: 
The language "all claims to it on part of 
any person" is substituted for "any defect 
in title of prior parties" in the original 
Section 57 in order to make it clear that 
the holder in due course takes the instru-
ment free not only from any claim of legal 
title but also from all liens, equities or 
claims of any other kind. 
[5,6] Here, the parties do not dispute 
that the CD assigned by twro of the Debtors 
(the Horbals) to Moxham met all the prereq-
uisites of negotiability. Thus, the negotiabili-
ty of the CD was completely unaffected by 
the separate mortgage agreement executed 
two weeks earlier between Debtors and Mox-
ham. When the assignment documents for 
the CD were executed, Moxham became im-
mediately vested in all of the Debtors rights 
in the CD. Also, since the loan Moxham 
extended constituted value and Moxham took 
the CD without notice of it being overdue or 
subject to any defenses, Moxham became a 
7. Section 3119(b) provides that "[A] separate 
agreement does not affect the negotiability of an 
instrument." 
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holder in due course of the CD. As such, the 
terms of the Assignment of Deposit gave 
Moxham the absolute right to enforce pay-
ment in its own name upon default. There-
fore, the CD ceased being a personal asset of 
two of the Debtors after the Debtors default-
ed on the loan secured by the CD. According-
ly, since the Deficiency Judgment Act is de-
signed to protect a debtor's personal assets 
and the CD was not a personal asset of the 
Debtors on the date of the sheriffs sale, the 
Deficiency Judgment Act does not apply to 
this situation and Moxham was free to liqui-
date the CD in accordance with the term? of 
the assignment agreement. 
Policy reasons also support the conclusion 
that the Deficiency Judgment Act does not 
apply in this situation. The effect of our 
decision today is that it provides protection 
against a default to a lender who obtains 
security for a loan. By giving the lender 
protection in cases of default, it will encour-
age lending and increase the ability to obtain 
a properly secured loan. This, in turn, will 
have the desired effect of encouraging the 
expansion of commerce. 
[7-9] Moreover, the conclusion urged by 
appellants, i.e., applying the Deficiency Judg-
ment Act, would lead to a result clearly not 
intended by the parties when they executed 
the Assignment of Deposit agreement. An 
assignment is a transfer of property or some 
other right from one person to another, and 
unless in some way qualified, it extinguishes 
the assignor's right to performance by the 
obligor and transfers that right to the assign-
ee. In re Purman's Estate, 358 Pa. 187, 56 
A.2d 86 (1948). Under the law of assign-
ment, the assignee succeeds to no greater 
rights than those possessed by the assignor. 
Himes r Cameron County Construction 
Corjx, 497 Pa. 637, 640, 444 A.2d 98, 100 
(1982). In interpreting an assignment, it will 
ordinarily be construed in accordance with 
the rules of construction governing contracts 
and the circumstances surrounding the exe-
cution of the assignment document. U.S. 
National Bank v Campbell 354 Pa. 483, 47 
A.2d 697 (1946). 
[10] Here, the assignment appointed 
Moxham as the true and lawful attorney with 
all rights, title and interest in the CD. Al>o. 
the assignment gave Moxham the power to 
execute and to withdraw any or all of the CD 
upon default without any notice or further 
consent of the Horbals. Moreover, the as-
signment to Moxham could only be released 
upon agreement of the parties or upon full 
repayment of the indebtedness. As the Su-
perior Court majority in this case aptly not-
ed: 
[AJpplying established contract law, the 
parties wTell could have provided for contin-
gencies requiring other, additional action 
by the Bank [Moxham] prior to its exercise 
of a clear right to liquidate the CD that is 
contained in the agreement. They did not. 
When the economic realities of the transac-
tion are considered, it is not surprising 
that the Bank sought, and obtained, addi-
tional security. When the debtors default-
ed on the mortgage note, the Bank's act in 
liquidating the CD wTas predictable. Based 
on this language and the circumstance un-
der which the CD was assigned to Moxham 
(to provide additional security for a loan), 
we must conclude that the assignment 
clearly and unambiguously divested the 
Horbals of any ownership and control of 
the CD on the date of default and vested 
such rights in Moxham. 
441 Pa.Super. at 472, 657 A.2d at 1265. 
Therefore, based on the language of the As-
signment of Deposit and the circumstances 
under which the CD was assigned to Mox-
ham, it is clear that the assignment agree-
ment divested the Debtors (the Horbals) of 
any ownership and control of the CD on the 
date of default and vested such rights in 
Moxham. 
In conclusion, we hold that the Deficiency 
Judgment Act does not apply to the present 
situation. Thus, in accordance with the as-
signment agreement, Moxham had the right 
to liquidate the CD after Debtors defaulted 
on the loan. Any other conclusion would 
render the additional security assigned by 
the Debtors to Moxham, via a contract, illu-
son since it would provide the Debtors with 
the means to circumvent a contractual pledge 
and Moxham would never be able to reach 
the security assigned to it to secure the 
indebtedness. Accordingly, for the reasons 
stated above, we affirm the order of the 
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iat the Deficiency 
apply to the facts of 
., and ZAPPALA, J., join 
pport of .Affirmance. 
, J., files an Opinion in Support 
in which CAPPY and NIGRO, 
/OV IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL 
disagree with the Majority that a judg-
.ent creditor, who purchases the judgment 
debtor's real estate at a sheriffs sale, has the 
right to redeem a certificate of deposit (CD) 
assigned to it as additional security for the 
underlying debt without complying with the 
Deficiency Judgment Act (the Act), 42 Pa. 
C.S. § 8103.l Where the judgment creditor 
then fails to file a timely petition to fix the 
fair market value of the real property sold in 
compliance with the Act, the underlying debt 
is extinguished and the judgment creditor is 
precluded from redeeming the additional col-
lateral security. Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
Neither party disputes the facts relevant 
to this appeal. On February 4, 1988, Mox-
ham National Bank 'Moxham) granted a loan 
of $120,000.00 to John Horbal, .Anthony Hor-
bal and Elaine Adams, d/b/a Potomac Associ-
ates II (Debtors, collectively). The Debtors 
executed a mortgage in favor of Moxham on 
property owned by the partnership at 502 
Main Street in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, as 
collateral for the loan. The parties under-
stood that the value of the property was not 
sufficient to fully secure the loan. Therefore, 
on February 18, 1988, John and Anthony 
1. As stated by the Majority, the Deficiency Judg-
ment Act provides: 
Whenever any real property is sold, directly or 
indirectly, to a judgment creditor in execution 
proceedings and the price lor which such 
property has been sold is not sufficient to satis-
fy the amount of the judgment, interests and 
costs and the judgment creditor seeks to col-
lect the balance due on said judgment, inter-
ests and costs, the judgment creditor shall peti-
tion the court having jurisdiction to fix the fair 
market value of the reai property sold. 
42 Pa.C.S. § 8103(a). If the judgment creditor 
fails to file a petition to fix fair market value 
within six (6) months of the sale, upon petition of 
the debtor, the court will mark the judgment as 
Horbal executed in favor of Moxham an "As-
signment of Deposits" as additional security 
for the loan due by the Debtors. Pursuant 
to the express terms of the Assignment of 
Deposits instrument, Anthony and John Hor-
bal agreed to: 
ASSIGN, TRANSFER and PLEDGE to 
Moxham National Bank . . . all of the As-
signors' right, title and interest, on Certifi-
cate of Deposit Number 2005581 in the 
principal amount of Twenty Five Thousand 
and 00/00 Dollars ($25,000).... 
The assignment instrument further provided: 
This Assignment and security interest is 
granted to the Bank to secure the prompt 
and unconditional payment and perfor-
mance when due of the following (all of 
which is herein called the "Indebtedness"). 
Any and all indebtedness, obligations and 
liabilities of Potomac Associates II to the 
Bank, now or hereafter existing or arising, 
due or to become due. 
Upon the complete payment of the indebt-
edness or upon the mutual agreement of 
the Assignors and the Bank, the Bank will 
release or partially release this Assign-
ment. 
Subsequently, the Debtors defaulted on 
the loan. Moxham initiated a mortgage fore-
closure action in the Cambria County Court 
of Common Pleas. The court entered a judg-
ment in favor of Moxham in the amount of 
$130,946.83 and issued a Writ of Execution 
on the judgment. Moxham then purchased 
the property at a sheriffs sale on December 
14, 1990 for a bid price of $666.40.2 On 
satisfied. 42 Pa.C.S. § 3103(d); First National 
Consumer Discount Co. v. Fethernian. 515 Pa. 85, 
527 A.2d 100(1987). 
The Act applies with equal force to actions in 
rem and in personam. See Fethernian; Valley 
Trust Company of Palmxra v. Lapitsky. 339 
Pa.Super. Ml, 488 A.2d 608 (1985); Marine 
Midland Bank v. Sunbelt, Inc.. 718 F.2d 61J 
(1933). But see First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lan-
caster County Tax Claim Bureau, 504 Pa. 179, 
470 A.2d 938 (1983)(opinion announcing judg-
ment ot court). 
2. Moxham acknowledges that, in 1991, the ap-
praised fair market value of the property was 
$57,500.00. In 1994, Moxham sold the property 
to a third party for the appraised value. 
HORBAL v. MOXHAM NAT. BANK 
Cite as 697 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997) 
Pa- 585 
January 29, 1991, Moxham withdrew the CD 
and applied the proceeds, $26,437.00, to the 
remaining loan balance. 
In November of 1991, Anthony and John 
Horbal assigned to Highland Financial, Ltd. 
and James R. Walsh (Appellants, collectively) 
their rights or causes of action, if any. relat-
ing to Moxham's withdrawal of the CD. Ap-
pellants subsequently demanded that Mox-
ham return the proceeds realized on the 
withdrawal of the CD. Moxham refused to 
turn over the CD proceeds. Appellants then 
filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Cambria County (trial court) against Mox-
ham seeking the value of the CD and other 
relief. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Moxham. The Superior 
Court affirmed.3 
The Majority Opinion, authored by Mr. 
Justice Castille. affirms the Order of the 
Superior Court, holding that Moxham was 
free to redeem the CD without complying 
with the Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 
§ 8103. Based on the premise that the As-
signment of Deposits transferred to Moxham 
all of the Debtors' rights and interests in the 
CD, the Majority Opinion turns on the nego-
tiability of the CD pursuant to Article 3 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 13 
Pa.CS. §§ 3101-3122. Unlike the Majority, 
however, I believe the principal focus of our 
inquiry is not the negotiability of the CD, but 
the nature of the assignment of the CD. 
Contrary to the Majority's reliance on Article 
3 of the UCC, relating to commercial paper, 
I believe this case is properly resolved with 
reference to Article 9,13 Pa.C.S. §§ 9101-14, 
bating to secured transactions. Because I 
conclude that the assignment did not divest 
the Debtors of all their rights and interests 
to the CD, but merely granted Moxham a 
security interest in the CD, I conclude that 
Moxham was required to comply with the 
Deficiency Judgment Act. 
It is well-settled that an assignment is a 
transfer of property, or a right or interest in 
5
* Summary judgment is proper where "the 
Ptaadings, depositions, answers to interrogato-
r s , and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
*fcsue as to am material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
l a
* " Pa R.C.P. 1035(bjT The record is to be 
property, and, unless in some uvy qualified, 
transfers the assignor's entire interest in the 
property. Purman Estate, 358 Pa. 187, 56 
A.2d 86 (1948)(emphasis added). Likewise, 
an assignment, absolute on its face, may only 
give the assignee a qualified interest in the 
assigned property, commensurate with the 
debt or liability secured. Seip v. Luubach, 
333 Pa. 225, 4 A.2d 149 (1939). In construing 
an assignment, courts may properly consider 
the circumstances attending the assignment. 
United States National Bank in Johnstoum 
v. Campbell 354 Pa. 483, 47 A.2d 697 (1946). 
Thus, parole evidence is admissible to estab-
lish that an assignment, absolute on its face, 
was intended to operate only as security for a 
debt. Biddle v. Biddle, 363 Pa. 426, 70 A.2d 
281 (1950). 
As defined in the UCC, a "security inter-
est" is an interest in personal property that 
secures payment of an obligation. 13 Pa.C.S. 
§ 1201. With certain exceptions, which are 
not relevant here, Article 9 of the UCC ap-
plies "to any transaction (regardless of its 
form) which is intended to create a security 
interest in personal property or fixtures in-
cluding goods, documents, instruments, gen-
eral intangibles, chattel paper or accounts 
. . . " 13 Pa.C.S. § 9102(a), and to security 
interests created by contract, including as-
signments, 13 Pa.C.S. § 9102(b). An en-
forceable security interest is created when: 
(1) the collateral is in the possession of the 
secured party pursuant to an agreement or 
the debtor has signed a security agreement 
that contains a description of the collateral; 
(2) value has been given; and (3) the debtor 
has rights in the collateral. 13 Pa.C.S. 
§ 9203(a); see also Reuter v. Citizens & 
Northern Bank, 410 Pa.Super. 199, 599 A.2d 
673 (1991). 
Here, by the express terms of the assign-
ment instrument, Anthony and John Horbal 
assigned all of their right, title and interest 
in the CD to Moxham. Although the assign-
ment instrument may appear absolute on its 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Pennsylvania State University v. 
County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142. 615 A.2d 303 
(1^92). Summary judgment is appropriate only 
where the right to relief is clear and free from 
doubt hi 
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face, it is undisputed that the parties intend-
ed the CD to operate as additional security 
for the underlying $120,000.00 loan obli-
gation. Moxham acknowledges that the Hor-
bals executed the Assignment of Deposits as 
additional collateral security for the loan be-
cause the parties understood that the real 
estate was insufficient to fully secure the 
debt. Further, although the assignment in-
strument refers to a grant of title, it also 
refers to the grant of a security interest to 
Moxham to secure any and all indebtedness. 
The instrument identifies the CD (wrhich was 
in Moxham's possession) and acknowledges 
receipt of valuable consideration for the as-
signment. Thus, the circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the assignment, 
and the assignment instrument itself, indi-
cate that the assignment was not absolute—it 
did not divest the Debtors of all of their 
rights and interests in the CD, but merely 
granted Moxham a security interest in the 
CD as additional collateral for the loan. Bid-
die; Purman Estate; Seip. Because Moxham 
merely acquired a security interest in the 
CD, after the foreclosure sale, Moxham was 
required to comply with the Deficiency Judg-
ment Act before redeeming the additional 
collateral securing the debt. First National 
Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 515 
Pa. 85, 527 A.2d 100 (1987), Commonwealth 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Hemsley, 395 Pa.Super. 
447, 577 A.2d 627, allocatur denied, 525 Pa. 
664, 583 A.2d 793 (1990); Auerbach v. Corn 
Exchange National Bank & Trust Co., 148 
F.2d 709 (1945). 
Upon default of the loan obligation, the 
Assignment of Deposits expressly granted 
Moxham the right to withdraw funds from 
the CD account, but required Moxham to 
return the CD upon complete payment of 
the "indebtedness." By operation of the De-
ficiency Judgment Act, Moxham was re-
quired to file a petition to fix the fair market 
value of the real estate sold to determine the 
remaining "indebtedness" under the Assign-
ment of Deposits. Fetherman; Hemsley, 
Auerbach. Moxham, however, failed to file a 
deficiency petition before redeeming the CD, 
within the six-month time limitation as pro-
vided in the Deficiency Judgment Act. 42 
Pa.C.S. § 8103. Moxham's failure to file a 
deficiency judgment petition within six (6) 
months of the sale of the real property < 
ated an irrebuttable presumption that 
foreclosure sale fully satisfied the Debt 
indebtedness. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8103(d); FeU 
man. Thus, any "indebtedness," as defii 
in the Assignment of Deposits, was ex 
guished. Consequently, Moxham's w: 
drawal of funds from the CD violated 
assignment agreement, which had mer 
granted Moxham a security interest foi 
debt that no longer existed. Appellants a 
therefore, entitled to recover the CD p 
ceeds. 
The Majority asserts that policy consid 
ations support the non-application of the I 
ficiency Judgment Act to this case. Pun 
ant to the Majority Opinion, however, 
judgment creditor is capable of a double i 
covery, clearly in contravention of the pi 
poses of the Deficiency Judgment Act. \ 
clearly explained in Fetherman: 
the Deficiency Judgment Act . . . was e 
acted to remedy an inequity resulting 
judgment debtors when the judgme 
creditor bought the debtor's property at 
forced sale. Prior to adoption of the Act 
judgment creditor could purchase, at she 
iff s sale, valuable real estate of the debt 
for a nominal sum, (i.e. costs and taxei 
and yet retain the full amount of his jud 
ment. The debtor w7as to be credited on 
for the actual sum realized at the sal 
Under the Deficiency Judgment Act, tl 
creditor's judgment is to be reduced by tl 
fair market value of the property bougl 
by the creditor rather than the sale pric 
Id. at 96, 527 A.2d at 105 (citations omitteo 
Thus, the purpose of the Act is to protect 
debtor's personal assets wThen, as here, r 
real property is sold at a foreclosure sale f( 
a purchase price far below7 its fair mark< 
value. Application of the Act, under thes 
circumstances, does not render additional s< 
curity "illusory7," as stated by the Majority 
Had Moxham complied with the Act, th 
judgment against the Debtors would onl 
have been reduced by the fair market valu 
of the property sold. Moxham would hav 
then been entitled to recover the value of th' 
CD. Only Moxham's failure to file a deficien 
cy judgment petition voided this additions 
securitv. 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
The Third District Court denied plaintiffs Motions for Leave to File Amended Complaint 
and for a Continuance while it granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. Plaintiff 
appeals claiming that it was error not to have allowed the amendment of the complaint and to 
have dismissed with prejudice. We reverse and remand. 
Plaintiffs complaint was filed on October 7, 1982, and generally alleged breach of contract 
and negligence in relation to the sale and installation of a computer system by defendant. The 
complaint indicated plaintiff as a Utah professional corporation (P.C). On January 17 1983, 
defendant answered and made certain counterclaims. Plaintiffs reply was filed on January 24, 
1983. Plaintiffs original Certificate of Readiness for Trial was objected to and stricken on 
February 24, 1983. Plaintiff was designate plaintiff as a P.C. On November 4, 1983, plaintiff to 
be a Utah partnership and added, as plaintiff, one of the members of the partnership in his 
individual capacity. At that time, plaintiffs counsel mailed a Stipulation and Order to Amend this 
complaint to defendant's counsel which was neither signed nor returned by the latter. Another 
Certificate of Readiness of Trial was filed on January 9, 1984. A pre-trial settlement conference 
was held on February 15, 1984, but without positive result. The trial court's minute entry 
concerning the conference indicates that the Second Amended complaint was before the court at 
that proceeding at which both sides were represented by counsel. 
Trial before the court was held on May 9, 1984. The Findings of Fact declare that plaintiff is 
a partnership made up of three P.C.'s, not named as parties to the suit, and that the three general 
partner-corporations are indispensable parties. The trial court also found that defendant's 
corporate vice president and its counsel had flown to Salt Lake City from Denver and that a 
continuance would substantially prejudice defendant. The trial judge dismissed plaintiffs 
complaint with prejudice but then allowed defendant to proceed on its counterclaim against the 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved 
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partnership. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on July 25, 1984. 
The pertinent analysis which must be undertaken is whether the trial court should have 
dismissed with prejudice rather than Dismiss with Leave to Amend, grant the Motion for Leave 
to Amend or grant a continuance. Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) declares: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest... No action shall be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a 
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
The thrust of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 is to require the joinder of persons needed for just 
adjudication. Rule 19(a) instructs the trial court to join as a party a person whose absence will 
prevent complete relief among those already parties. A plain reading of Rules 17(a) and 19(a) 
reveals that the trial court should make every effort to insure that the proceeding adjudicates that 
rights of those necessary and intended to be before the court. In conjunction with this basic 
concept is the requirement in Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) which states that leave shall be freely given to 
amend a pleading when justice so requires. This admonition is given the sentence which declares 
that subsequent amendments to pleadings may be made only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party. 
Defendant cannot claim that it was not aware of plaintiffs status as a partnership as early as 
nine months prior to the trial. During the taking of deposition in August of 1983, defendant's 
counsel was informed that plaintiff was a partnership. Plaintiffs status was also revealed to 
defendant both by the Stipulation and Order to Amend mailed to counsel and at the pre-trial 
settlement conference. 1 
The issue of dismissing an action with prejudice was recently addressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986). The trial 
court's dismissal for a failure to join indispensable parties was affirmed but the Supreme Court 
remanded with the instruction to enter the dismissal without prejudice. That Court wrote: 
While the court below properly exercised its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs action for 
failing to comply with Rule 19(a), it was improper to do so with prejudice. Dismissal with 
prejudice under Rule 41(b) is a harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes a presentation of 
a plaintiffs claims on their merits. Our rules of procedure are intended to encourage the 
adjudication of disputes on their merits. 
Not having considered the merits of plaintiffs claims, there was no reason for the court to 
dismiss with prejudice and prevent future consideration of the claims should the defect be 
corrected. The trial court abused its discretion by entering its Rule 41(b) dismissal with 
prejudice. 
Id, at 1020. 
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In this case we believe the court abused its discretion in not allowing the amendment or 
granting a continuance. Defendant claimed no surprise, nor could it, but instead relied on the 
specter of increased costs and complexity if the amendment was granted. Despite the parties 
being represented by the same counsel throughout the proceedings and despite there being no 
surprise, the dismissal with prejudice was granted. While courts are given great latitude and 
discretion in the application of the law, they still must have a sufficient grounds to apply the 
"harsh and permanent remedy" of a dismissal with prejudice. No such grounds appear here. 
The dismissal with prejudice and the judgment are reversed and the case is remanded for 
trial. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 At trial, counsel for defendant admitted receiving the request to stipulate to the filing of the Second 
Amended complaint but stated that he was unwilling to so stipulate. 
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AUTHOR: OAKS 
OPINION 
OAKS, Justice: This is an action by a participant in a joint venture, referred to here as a 
partnership,^ to recover damages suffered when defendants thwarted the purchase and 
development of property by the partnership. Neither the partnership nor plaintiffs partner was 
named as a party. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that plaintiff had failed to join an 
indispensable party. Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). We affirm.2 
In early 1978, plaintiff discovered a parcel of real property in Washington county, Utah, that 
he believed had excellent potential for development. After ascertaining that the property was for 
sale, plaintiff organized a partnership under the name Padre Canyon Venture to purchase and 
develop the property. Initially, the venture included plaintiff and one Sullivan as partners. These 
two agreed to seek other partners to invest in the venture. Plaintiff performed preliminary work in 
an effort to negotiate the purchase, clear the property of liens, and set the development in motion. 
For this he was to receive a 15% interest in the Padre Canyon partnership. The remaining 85% 
interest was to be divided among Sullivan and any new investors. 
Plaintiff first contacted a group of investors headed by one Jacobs. Plaintiff and Sullivan 
believed they had struck a deal with the Jacobs group until a dispute arose over the division of the 
investors1 85%. While attempting to resolve this issue, plaintiff and Sullivan made contract with 
defendants, who expressed an interest in joining the venture if negotiations with the Jacobs group 
proved fruitless. Plaintiff, on behalf of Padre Canyon, discussed the project in detail with 
defendants. 
According to Plaintiffs rendition of the facts, which we accept as true for this appeal, St. 
Pierre v. Edmonds, Utah, 645 P.2d 615, 616-17 (1982), Padre Canyon broke off negotiations 
with the Jacobs group in reliance upon the defendants1 representation that they were interested in 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
2 
joining the venture. Thereafter, defendants declined to participate in Padre Canyon, blocked that 
partnership's purchase of the development property, and eventually purchased the property for 
themselves. Plaintiff then brought this action in his own name to recover the damages he allegedly 
suffered (through his 15% share) due to defendants1 tortious interference with contract, tortious 
interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of agreement. The question on this 
appeal is whether plaintiff, who was a partner in the venture, may bring an action in his own name 
without joining his copartner had without naming the partnership. We hold that he cannot. 
Courts universally hold that an individual partner may not sue in his own name to enforce a 
liability owed to a partnership. Gustafson v. State, Ariz. App., 462 P.2d 869 (1979); Stevens v. 
St. Joseph's Hospital, 52 A.D. 2d 722, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 927 (1976); Marx v. Lenske, Or., 500 
P.2d 715 (1972). See 60 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 325 (1972). One partner's failure to join all 
partners as plaintiffs is grounds for dismissal for lack of necessary parties. White v. Jackson, 
S.C., 166 S.E.2d 211 (1969); Benson v. Pachetti, Ala., 349 So. 2d 17 (1977). See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 19(a). 
Under the law of some states a partnership is empowered to sue in the partnership name. See 
generally 60 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 322-24 (1972). That question has not been decided in 
this state, Wall Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 542, 544 
(1979), and need not be decided in this case. If a partnership can sue in its own name, the 
partnership is obviously an indispensable party in an action to enforce a partnership claim, since it 
is the real party in interest. Dalby v. United states Fidelity and Guaranty Co., La. App., 365 
So. 2d 568 (1978). If a partnership cannot sue in its own name, it must sue in the name of the 
partners, and all are necessary parties, as explained above. In either event, this plaintiff has failed 
to join an indispensable party and his complaint was properly dismissed on that basis. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 17(a). 
Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect the same interests: judicial economy and fairness to 
the parties in litigation. The purpose of Rule 19(a), "which requires the joinder of indispensable 
parties as a condition to suit, is to guard against the entry of judgments which might prejudice the 
rights of such parties in their absence." Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price 
Water Users Association, Utah, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (1982). In addition, by requiring joinder of 
necessary parties, Rule 19(a) protects the interests of parties who are present by precluding 
multiple litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject matter as the original litigation. 
Rule 17(a) serves essentially the same policy by requiring an action to be brought by the real 
party in interest. As we held in Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 2d 155, 163, 239 P.2d 745, 748 
(1952): 
The reason the defendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party 
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another and 
permit the defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the real owner of the 
cause. 
Accord Nordling v. Johnston, Or., 283 P.2d 994, 997 (1955) (Rule 17(a) "was enacted for 
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the benefit of a party defendant, to protect him from being again harassed for the same cause."). 
Here, the cause of action clearly belonged to the Padre Canyon partnership or partners, and 
not to plaintiff individually. In the complaint, plaintiff repeatedly states that he performed work 
and made contacts "on behalf of Padre Canyon." Padre Canyon or its partners would have owned 
the property had the purchase and development been successful. It was only through Padre 
Canyon that plaintiff would have derived any profit, and it is only through Padre Canyon that he 
suffers the damage he has alleged. 
Unless plaintiff could show that he suflfered direct injury personally, as distinguished from 
injury to the partnership, this complaint was properly dismissed. In Hauer v. Bankers Trust New 
York Corp., 509 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981), alTd per curiam, 671 F.2d 1020 (1982), a jury 
awarded a plaintiff $700,001 damages for tortious interference with contractual relation. 
However, the trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v., holding that it was 
actually the partnership in which plaintiff was a participant that suflfered the damage, not plaintiff 
personally. 
The evidence described above and the inferences the plaintiff draws from the evidence 
arguably support the theory that [one of the defendants] misappropriated an equity that the 
partnership had in the Scotsland project. In addition, it cannot be denied that the value of the 
partnership's equity in Scotsland was directly related to the creativity and industry of the plaintiff, 
James Hauer. However, this does not mean that [defendant] has deprived Mr. Hauer of any rights 
or property belonging to him personally. 
509 F. supp. at 175 (emphasis in original). 
In our case, as in Hauer, plaintiff alleges that he dedicated hard work and energy toward the 
success of the Padre Canyon partnership. However, even according to the clear allegations of 
plaintiffs complaint, the rights that were infringed belonged to Padre Canyon, not to plaintiff. 
Consequently, plaintiff was required either to name the partnership as the real party in interest or 
to join his copartner as a necessary party. 
Plaintiff argues that since he is only suing to recover his portion of the partnership's claim, he 
should be entitled to go forward in his individual capacity. Plaintiff does not explain how or 
whether a final judgment granting him recovery of his 15% from defendants would preclude the 
partnership or the other partner from later suing on their claims. Nor does plaintiff explain how or 
whether this action would preclude the partnership or the other partners from disputing plaintiffs 
entitlement to the 15% share he seeks to collect from defendants. Allowing plaintiff to go forward 
individually could subject defendants to multiple liability and could spawn multiple litigation 
among the partnership, the individual partner, and defendants. This would be unfair to absent 
partners, unfair to defendants, and contrary to judicial economy. That is undoubtedly why Rules 
17(a) and 19(a) forbid such a result. As the court held in Stevens v. St Joseph's Hospital, 
supra, 381 N.Y.S. 2d at 928: 
Plaintiff, as an individual, cannot assert that he has been entitled to one-third of the defendant's 
monthly payments under the contract, free of any partnership commitments. A partnership cause 
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of action belongs to the partners jointly, and a member of the partnership may not recover on a 
partnership obligation by his individual suit. 
Affirmed. 3 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 A joint venture is subject to the same rules as a partnership. Vern Shutte & Sons v. Broadbent, 24 
Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885 (1970); Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952); Scott Company 
of California v. Enco Construction Co., Miss., 264 So. 2d 409 (1972). 
2 The trial court also granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. Since we affirm the 
dismissal, we do not reach the questions treated in the summary judgment. 
3 Affirmance of a judgment of dismissal on the basis cited here does not preclude a plaintiff from 
renewing his claim in a complaint naming the indispensable party or the real party in interest. One partner 
cannot bar a copartner from collecting on debts owed to the partnership. Stark v. Utica Screw Products, 
Inc., 103 Misc. 163, 425 N.Y.S. 2d 750 (1980). Where one partner refuses to join an action, the other 
partners) may name him as a plaintiff by indemnifying him against costs, Benson v. Pachetti, Ala., 349 So. 
2d 17 (1977), or by making him an involuntary plaintiff, Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). 
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AUTHOR: ZIMMERMAN 
OPINION 
Petitioner Michael Landes challenges a decision of the court of appeals upholding a grant of 
summary judgment in favor of respondent Capital City Bank ("Capital") on a guarantee 
agreement, signed by Landes and the other plaintiffs, that was appurtenant to a note held in part 
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by the Small Business Administration ("SBA"). Landes had opposed the grant of summary 
judgment on grounds that, inter alia, the SBA was an indispensable party. The trial court 
disagreed. Before the court of appeals, Landes argued that the trial court failed to explain 
adequately its conclusion that the SBA was not indispensable under rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to explain its rule 
19 analysis, but performed its own analysis and upheld the trial court's decision on the ground 
that the SBA was, in fact, not an indispensable party. On certiorari, Landes again raises the rule 
19 issue, this time contending that the court of appeals' analysis is flawed. We hold that the court 
of appeals misanalyzed the facts under rule 19, but we affirm on grounds that the SBA is not a 
necessary party. 
On December 24, 1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. ("Bagel Nosh"), executed a 
promissory note in favor of Capital in the amount of $300,000. The SBA participated in the note 
by guaranteeing 90 percent of the outstanding unpaid balance. Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and 
Michael Landes ("guarantors") executed personal guaranties for the note, secured by trust deeds 
to certain condominium units at Snowbird, a ski resort in Utah. The guaranties were on SBA 
forms and were executed in favor of both Capital and SBA. On March 30, 1983, after Bagel 
Nosh had fallen several months behind in payments, Capital and Bagel Nosh executed a 
modification of the loan agreement, in which the guarantors agreed personally to guarantee the 
full amount of the loan.l 
On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under chapter 
11 of the bankruptcy code. On March 12, 1986, the guarantors filed this action in the district 
court, naming Capital as defendant and seeking a declaratory judgment that the guaranties were 
void and that the guarantors were discharged from any obligation under the guaranties. Capital 
filed an answer and a counterclaim, seeking a judgment against the guarantors for the 
outstanding balance of the loan plus interest. Capital also sought judicial foreclosure against the 
real property and a declaration that the claims of other creditors were subordinate to Capital's 
claims. 
On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the guaranties 
entitled Capital to judgment as a matter of law. With its motion, Capital submitted the affidavit 
of M. A. Allem, executive vice president of Capital, in which he stated that the "SBA is a 
participating lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent 
(90%) of the outstanding balance." 
In response, the guarantors argued that Capital was entitled to sue only on its proportionate 
share of the loan, which was 10 percent. The guarantors contended that the SBA held a 90 
percent interest in the loan and, therefore, that the SBA was a necessary and indispensable party 
to the action. The guarantors also argued that summary judgment was improper because a 
genuine issue of fact existed with regard to the effect of the loan modification agreement. 
On September 5th, Capital filed a supplemental affidavit of Mr. Allem in which he stated. 
"Capital City is the legal holder of the note and guaranties... and has been authorized in writing 
by SBA to sue upon the note and guaranties and accelerate the maturity thereof." 
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On February 4, 1987, the trial court granted Capital's motion for summary judgment. The 
court awarded Capital a judgment for the full amount of the loan plus interest, $293,379.64, and 
issued a decree of foreclosure against the condominium units. In granting summary judgment, 
the trial court addressed several of the guarantors' arguments, including the effect of the loan 
modification agreement. The trial court, however, did not address the issue of any legal 
distinction that might exist between the 10 percent portion of the loan attributable to Capital and 
the 90 percent portion attributable to the SBA. The trial court also treated the issue of the 
indispensability of the SB A's joinder summarily, stating: 
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, the Small Business Administration, 
has not been joined. That defense is without merit. In the first instance, the defense has not been 
pled, [sic] but additionally, the SBA is not under the present interpretation of the Rules of 
Procedure an indispensable party to this action. 
The guarantors appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. See Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 
767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing 
to explain the basis for its conclusion that the SBA was not indispensable under rule 19. The 
court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the trial court on grounds that the SBA was not 
indispensable to the action, but it did so without first addressing the preliminary rule 19(a) issue 
of whether the SBA was a necessary party. 
Landes petitioned for certiorari, contending that the court of appeals erred by failing to 
consider the issue of whether the SBA was a necessary party before determining that the SBA 
was an indispensable party. We granted certiorari and now affirm. 
We note at the outset the procedural posture of this case. It comes to us on certiorari from the 
court of appeals, which considered Landes' appeal from a grant of summary judgment. Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Utah State Coalition of Senior 
Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H 
Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). We accord no particular deference to conclusions of 
law, whether made by the trial court or the court of appeals, but review such conclusions for 
correctness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
Landes argues that the court of appeals erred by failing to add the SBA as a necessary party. 
He asserts that under a proper rule 19 analysis, a trial court should first determine whether a party 
is necessary under the criteria of rule 19(a). If the party is necessary and can be joined, the rule 
requires that the party be joined. Landes argues that a court must first find that a party is 
necessary before it proceeds to the issue of indispensability; therefore, because the court of 
appeals based its disposition of his appeal on the issue of indispensability, it must have held that 
the SBA was a necessary party, even though that holding was not articulated in the decision. 
Landes argues further that because joinder of the SBA was feasible, it was also mandatory under 
rule 19(a). Therefore, he argues, the court of appeals erred by failing to require joinder of the 
SBA. 
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In response, Capital argues that the SBA is not a necessary party because the SBA authorized 
Capital to assert SBA's rights under the guaranty. Alternatively, Capital argues that the court of 
appeals used the terms "necessary" and "indispensable" interchangeably. 
Because the disposition of this case turns on rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
we set it forth here: 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject of action shall be joined as a 
party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability 
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should 
join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue 
of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Rule 19(b), which deals with indispensable parties and is also at issue, 
states: 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described in 
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity 
and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered 
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions 
in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, 
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b). 
Rule 19 of the Utah rules is essentially similar to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Therefore, in addition to applicable Utah cases, we look to the abundant federal 
experience in the area for guidance. See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 n.l 
(Utah 1984). 
The basic purpose of rule 19 is "to protect the interests of absent persons as well as those 
already before the court from multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations." 7 C. 
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1602, at 21 (1986) 
[hereinafter C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane]; see Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 
1984) ("[B]y requiring joinder of necessary parties, rule 19(a) protects the interests of parties 
who are present by precluding multiple litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject 
matter as the original litigation...."). In performing a rule 19 analysis, the court should discuss 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved 
5 
specific facts and reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is or is not necessary under 
rule 19(a) or indispensable under rule 19(b). See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th 
Cir. 1977). Thus, the court of appeals was correct in holding that the trial court erred by failing to 
discuss the facts and reasoning, within the framework of rule 19, by which it made its 
determination of indispensability. 
We next address the issue of whether the SB A was a necessary and indispensable party and 
therefore should have been joined in the action. To determine whether the court of appeals erred 
by declining to join the SB A, we must first determine whether the SB A was a necessary party 
under rule 19(a). Only if we first find the SB A to be a necessary party can we properly proceed 
to the 19(b) question of indispensability. To this extent, Landes is correct in observing that the 
court of appeals improperly considered indispensability without first deciding the necessary party 
question. 
To determine whether a party is necessary, a court should consider the two general factors in 
rule 19(a). First, a party is necessary if "in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (1). Second, a party is necessary if he claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, 
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2). If the court finds that the party is necessary according to these 
criteria, rule 19 provides that the party "shall be joined." Thus, under the language of the rule, if 
the party is necessary and joinder is feasible, then joinder is mandatory. Nevertheless, failure to 
join generally is not considered to be a jurisdictional defect. See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. 
Kane, § 1611.2 
We must therefore first address rule 19(a)(1) to determine whether in the absence of the SB A 
complete relief can be accorded among the guarantors and Capital. As the court of appeals noted, 
the supplemental affidavit of M. A. Allem states that Capital "has been authorized in writing by 
SB A to sue upon the note and guaranties and accelerate the maturity thereof. "3 This statement 
was not contradicted or challenged by the guarantors and must be accepted as an uncontested fact 
for purposes of summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
With this foundation, it is clear that the absence of the SBA will not prevent Capital from 
obtaining complete relief. Likewise, because the SBA authorized Capital to sue on the note and 
the guaranties, the absence of the SBA does not prevent the guarantors from obtaining complete 
relief. Capital was authorized to stand in the place of the SBA, and the guarantors were entitled 
to assert any claims or defenses they would have been able to assert against the SBA. Joining the 
SBA as a party would be redundant. 
Landes asserts that the failure to join the SBA at the trial court level deprived him of the 
opportunity to assert certain defenses against the unsecured 90 percent portion of the loan held 
by the SBA and caused him to suffer collateral damages. This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, the substance of Landes' argument is that the unsecured portion of the claim, held 
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originally by the SBA, should be treated differently with respect to the property that secured the 
note. In regard to this argument, joinder of the SBA does not help Landes because, as mentioned 
above, the SBA has authorized Capital to sue on the note and guaranties and, in effect, to 
represent the SBA's interest in the case. Merely adding the SBA would not change the underlying 
action, regardless of whether the unsecured portion of the note was treated differently. 
Second, Landes has failed to articulate before the trial court, the court of appeals, or this court 
what specific defenses he may have to the SBA claim. He has similarly failed to specify any 
collateral damages he has suffered by reason of the SBA's absence. Thus, we have no grounds for 
saying that the guarantors cannot obtain complete relief in the absence of the SBA, and we 
therefore cannot find the SBA necessary under the rule 19(a)(1) test. 
We next address rule 19(a)(2) to determine whether the SBA is a necessary party because it 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the matter in [its] absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect 
that interest or (ii) leave [either Capital or the guarantors] subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of [its] claimed interest. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). With regard to the subpart (i) issue, SBA has authorized Capital to 
represent the SBA's interest in this matter. Furthermore, SBA has not complained about the 
nonjoinder, but rather has supported Capital in pursuing this action. Thus, we cannot say that the 
SBA is situated such that the disposition of the matter in the absence of the SBA might impair or 
impede the SBA's ability to protect its interest. 
Under the subpart (ii) analysis, we likewise detect no danger of multiple or otherwise 
inconsistent judgments. The absence of the SBA does not subject Capital to a risk of multiple 
litigation. Similarly, the guarantors are not subject to a risk of multiple or inconsistent 
obligations because the SBA has authorized Capital to sue on the note and guaranties and thus to 
represent SBA's interest before the trial court. The trial court granted Capital a judgment based 
on the entire outstanding balance of the note; regardless of whether the guarantors might have 
independent defenses or claims against the SBA, the SBA could have no remaining cause of 
action against the guarantors once the underlying note was satisfied. 
For these reasons, we find that the SBA was not a necessary party under rule 19(a). We 
therefore need not address the issue of whether joinder was feasible. 
We next address the issue of indispensability. Only if a party is found necessary under the 
rule 19(a) analysis and the party cannot feasibly be joined does a court need to analyze 
indispensability under rule 19(b).4 Because the SBA is not a necessary party, there is no reason 
for us to address the issue of indispensability. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in 
failing to explain its reasons for concluding that the SBA was indispensable. The court of appeals 
erred in its analysis, however, because it addressed the issue of indispensability without first 
addressing the necessary party issue. The issue of indispensability does not arise unless the court 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved 
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determines, first, that the party is necessary and second, that the party cannot feasibly be joined. 
Finally, we note that if Landes had been concerned about the absence of the SB A, he could 
have included the SBA as a defendant in the original complaint or he could have requested leave 
to amend under rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to add the SBA as a defendant. Rule 
15 expressly favors amendment, stating that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice 
so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Having himself failed to join the SBA, Landes cannot now 
complain that the court's failure to require joinder of the SBA is reversible error. See 
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel, 713 P.2d 55, 60 (Utah 1986). 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the SBA was not a necessary party. The 
decision of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 The Loan Restructure Agreement stated: Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes personally guarantee 
the Bank's loan to the Borrower. Each is personally liable for the entire indebtedness to the Bank. Each 
agrees to provide the Bank by February 28th of each year a current personal financial statement as 
specified in the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979. 
2. See, e.g., Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 166-67, 6 L. Ed. 289 (1825); Graf v. 
Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1983); Jim Walter Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 
625 F.2d 676, 681 (5th Cir. 1980); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 628 (2d Cir. 1976); Warner 
v. First Natl Bank of Minneapolis, 236 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 927, 77 S. Ct. 
226, 1 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1956); Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 202 F.2d 
944, 946 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 346 U.S. 899, 74 S. Ct. 225, 98 L. Ed. 400, (1953); Dyer v. Stauffer, 19 
F.2d 922, 922 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 275 U.S. 551, 48 S. Ct. 114, 72 L. Ed. 421 (1927); Rippey v. 
Denver U.S. Nat'l Bank, 42 F.R.D. 316, 318-19 (D. Colo. 1967). 
3 In his affidavit, Mr. Allem stated: 
5. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the SBA Participation Guaranty, Capital City is the holder of all loan 
instruments, which in this case includes the note executed by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., on 
December 24, 1979,... and the Guaranty Agreements of even date executed by Sidney Seftel and Theresa 
L. Seftel and Michael S. Landes... and until those instruments are transferred to SBA, Capital City is 
entitled to sue upon the loan instruments including acceleration of the maturity of the note and guaranties 
provided Capital City has obtained the written consent of SBA. 
6. Capital City is the legal holder of the note and guaranties involved in this action, and Capital City 
has not transferred the note or guaranties to SBA and has been authorized in writing by SBA to sue upon 
the note and guaranties and accelerate the maturity thereof. 
4 Rule 19(b) analysis involves questions of equity and therefore is committed to the discretion of the 
court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (court to "determine whether in equity and good conscience the action 
should proceed among the parties before it"); see also 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, §§ 1607, 1611. 
The analysis is basically a balancing of the inequities that would result from proceeding without the 
nonjoined party, specifically including the four factors of rule 19(b). Based on these factors, a trial court 
has the discretion to proceed without the party or to dismiss the action for failure to join an indispensable 
party. See Bonneville Tower Condominiums Management Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 
728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1988). 
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stention can be applied to "state adminis-
trative proceedings in which important 
state interests are vindicated, so long as in 
the course of those proceedings, the federal 
plaintiff would have a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate his constitutional claim " 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 106 S Ct 
at 2723. We thus must answer three rele-
vant questions: (1) whether the state pro-
ceedings "constitute an ongoing state judi-
cial proceeding;" (2) whether the proceed-
ings "implicate important state interests," 
and (3) whether there is "an adequate op-
portunity in the state proceedings to raise 
constitutional challenges," Middlesex, 457 
U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521. 
Turning our attention to these inquiries, 
we find that the administrative proceeding 
before the Council constitutes an ongoing 
judicial proceeding under Middlesex and 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, as it is 
appealable to the Civil District Court for 
the Parish of Orleans, and is thus "within 
the appellate jurisdiction" of the Louisiana 
courts. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 
106 S.Ct at 2723. The interest of the 
Council of New Orleans in setting retail 
rates is clearly important here: indeed, jur-
isdiction over retail rates is preserved to 
the states by the terms of the Federal 
Power Act. Finally, we find that through 
the appellate process, NOPSI would have a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate its fed-
eral claims. As in Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission, NOPSI cites no authority indicat-
ing that state review cannot be had of its 
claims. 106 S.Ct at 2724. As there is no 
"bad faith, harrassment or other exception-
al circumstances" which dictate to the con-
3. In addition, the Council at the time NOPSI 
sought injunctive relief from the district court 
had not yet taken any definitive action on 
NOPSI's Ma\ 17, 1985, rate increase application 
Concerns of federalism lead us to treat chal-
lenges to anticipated state agency action "with 
special skepticism " Wnght and Miller § 3532 
6 In Public Service Commission of Utah v 
Wycoff Co., 344 U S 237, 244, 73 S Ct 236, 241, 
97 L Ed 291 (1952) the Supreme Court refused 
to address the merits of a claim it described as 
seeking a declaratory judgment for the purpose 
of "guardfingj against the possibility that [the 
local commission] would attempt to prevent re-
trary, the district court's decision to ab-
stain could be grounded on Younger3 
For the above reasons, we conclude that 
the district court's decision to abstain on 
the instant facts was a proper exercise of 
discretion. Given the above, our initial 
opinion reversing the district court is with-
drawn in part, and the order of the district 
court dismissing NOPSFs claim is AF-
FIRMED. The mandate shall issue forth-
with 
PRIDE EXPLORATION, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
MARSHALL EXPLORATION, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 85-2541. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Sept. 2, 1986. 
Seller brought suit against buyer for 
breach of contract to purchase working 
interest in oil and gas leases. The United 
States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, Robert M. Parker, J., found 
that seller had failed to deliver interest as 
required by contract, and seller appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Jerre S. Williams, 
spondent from operating under its certificate 
from the Interstate Commerce Commission" 
(emphasis in original) The Court observed: 
as the declaratory proceeding is here invoked, 
it is even less appropriate because, m addition 
to foreclosing an administrative body, it is 
incompatible with a proper federal-state rela-
tionship The carrier, being in some disagree-
ment with the State Commission, rushed into 
federal court to get a declaration which either 
is intended in ways not disclosed to tie the 
Commission's hands before it can act or has 
no purpose at all 
Id at 247, 73 S Ct at 242 
PRIDE EXPLORATION v. 
Cite as 798 F.2d 
Circuit Judge, held that fact that assign-
ment of limited partnership's working in-
terest lacked specific statement that trust-
ee-in-bankruptcy for general partner held 
power to convey limited partnership's inter-
est did not render title unmarketable, and 
assignment was sufficient under Texas law 
to transfer partnership's working interest 
Reversed and remanded 
1. Mines and Minerals <s=*99(3) 
Fact that general partner was errone-
ously identified as party transferring work-
ing interest in oil and gas leases on limited 
partnership's behalf was merely surplus-
age, and did not affect validity of assign-
ment 
2. Bankruptcy <^ >676 
Trustee-in-bankruptcy of program op-
erator and general partner was proper par-
ty to transfer limited partnership's mterest 
in lease. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 363(cXD. 
3. Mines and Minerals e=>74(3) 
Fact that assignment of limited part-
nership's working interest in oil and gas 
leases lacked specific statement that trust-
ee-in-bankruptcy for general partner held 
power to convey limited partnership's inter-
est did not render title unmarketable, and 
assignment was sufficient under Texas law 
to transfer partnership's working interest 
4. Deeds <s=>95 
Technical words and phrases are not 
controlling in deeds. 
5. Deeds <^26, 45, 47 
If grantor and grantee can be deter-
mined from whole of instrument, and doc-
ument is signed and acknowledged by 
grantor, then document accomplishes legal-
ly effective conveyance. 
Harold Brown Cameron, Jr., Tyler, Tex., 
for plaintiffs-appellants 
ARSHALL EXPLORATION 865 
I (5th Clr. 1986) 
Johnny R. McCollum, Dean A. Searle, 
Longview, Tex., for defendant-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Eastern Distrtict of Texas. 
Before GOLDBERG, WILLIAMS and 
DAVIS, Circuit Judges. 
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: 
In this diversity case, the district court 
held that appellee Marshall Exploration, 
Inc (Marshall) was not in breach of a con-
tract to purchase the working interest in oil 
and gas leases from appellants Pride Ex-
ploration, Inc. and others (Pride) The 
court found that Pride had failed to deliver 
the interest as required by the contract. 
Upon timely appeal by Pride, we reverse 
and remand for a new trial. 
Pride had agreed to deliver the full 100 
percent of the working interest in certain 
Texas oil and gas leases to Marshall in 
exchange for $48,487.50. The leases were 
known as the 'Winston Taylor leases." 
The working interest in the leases was held 
jointly by numerous parties, including the 
Lexco 81-2 Drilling Program (Lexco) with 
20.375 percent, Latham Exploration Com-
pany with 2 percent, and James Latham 
with 2 percent. Marshall and Pride agreed 
that one working interest owner, E.S. 
Boase, would secure assignments from the 
other owners and would then convey the 
entire interest to Marshall. 
This case arose as a result of Marshall's 
refusal to accept the leases and to pay the 
purchase price for them. Pride brought a 
suit for breach of contract seeking dam-
ages of $48,487.50. The district court held 
that a contract between the parties existed, 
but that Marshall had justifiably refused to 
perform because Pnde had failed to deliver 
the required 100 percent of the working 
interest. The district court's holding was 
based upon a finding that as part of the 
collecting of the 100 percent interest a pro-
ported assignment of Lexco's working in-
terest to Boase was not adequate to convey 
marketable title ] The court made its ml-
1. The judge issued an ora! finding from the IC defect or defects he found in Lexco's assign-
bench There was no statement as to the specif- ment 
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ing in the middle of the trial, determining 
that no further testimony was necessary 
once the Lexco assignment was declared 
invalid. On appeal to this Court, Pride 
urges that the district court erred in hold-
ing that the Lexco assignment did not 
transfer marketable title under Texas law. 
Lexco is a limited partnership of which 
Latham Exploration and James Latham are 
general partners. The partnership agree-
ment provided that Lexco's property could 
be conveyed solely by the "program opera-
tor." At all relevant times, Latham Explo-
ration was Lexco's designated program op-
erator and was in bankruptcy. William 
Sandoz was the trustee-in-bankruptcy of 
Latham Exploration. 
The assignment at issue, Appendix A, 
showed "Lexco by James A. Latham, Gen-
eral Partner" as the grantor of the work-
ing interest. The instrument contained 
Lexco's signature "by James A. Latham, 
General Partner, and INDIVIDUALLY." 
Additionally, Latham Exploration's name 
was typed below James Latham's signature 
and was signed by Sandoz. Nothing in the 
instrument indicated that Latham Explora-
tion was signing in its capacity as Lexco's 
program operator, or in any other way 
specifically connected Latham Exploration 
with Lexco. 
[1] Appellee claims two defects in the 
Lexco assignment. First, the granting 
clause named "Lexco by James A. Latham, 
General Partner" as the assignor. As both 
parties agree, James Latham had no au-
thority under the limited partnership agree-
ment to convey Lexco's interest because he 
was not the "program operator." Lexco, 
however, was properly named as the grant-
or. The fact that James Latham was erro-
neously identified as the party transferring 
the interest on Lexco's behalf was merely 
surplusage, and did not affect the validity 
of the assignment. Terry v. Zaffran, 483 
So.2d 526, 527 (Fla.App.1986). 
2. As the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the program 
operator, Sandoz was the proper party to trans-
fer Lexco's interest in the lease. 11 U.S.C. 
[2] Second, the document failed to re-
cite that Sandoz, the trustee-in-bankruptcy 
of Latham Exploration Company, was con-
veying Lexco's interest in his capacity as 
Lexco's program operator.2 Ideally, the 
signature line should have contained the 
word "by" in front of Latham Exploration 
Company's name and should have disclosed 
the status of Latham Exploration as "pro-
gram operator." 
[3] Surprisingly, we have discovered 
virtually no case law, including Texas 
cases, dealing with the question of whether 
a conveyance, properly naming the grantor 
and signed by the proper party, is never-
theless invalid because the signer failed to 
indicate the capacity in which he signed. 
Our review of the few applicable cases 
convinces us that it did not render the title 
unmarketable for the document to lack a 
specific statement that Sandoz as trustee-
in-bankruptcy for Latham Exploration 
Company held the power to convey the 
Lexco interest. 
[4,5] Technical words and phrases are 
not controlling in deeds. Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. Exxon Corp., 663 S.W.2d 858, 
867 (Tex.App.—Houston 1983), affd 678 
S.W.2d 944 (Tex.1984). If a grantor and 
grantee can be determined from the whole 
of the instrument, and the document is 
signed and acknowledged by the grantor, 
then the document accomplishes a legally 
effective conveyance. Id. The cases 
found indicate that failure of a signer of a 
real estate conveyance to indicate the ca-
pacity in which he is signing the document 
does not render the title unmarketable. 
Ford v. Warner, 176 S.W. 885, 888 (Tex. 
Civ App.1915); Odell v. Kennedy, 26 Tex. 
Civ.App. 439, 64 S.W. 802 (1901, writ ref d); 
Bennett v. Virginia Ranch & Cattle Co., 1 
Tex.Civ.App. 321, 21 S.W. 126, 128 (1892). 
The rule was stated by a Kentucky court in 
the context of a corporate real estate con-
veyance as follows: "Regardless of the 
form of the signature, the body must show 
that it is the act of the corporation. This 
§ 363(c)(1). Marshall does not dispute the au-
thority of Sandoz to transfer the working inter-
est. 
PRIDE EXPLORATION v. MARSHALL EXPLORATION 867 
Cite as 798 F.2d 864 (5th Or. 1986) 
done, it is sufficient if it is signed by the 
proper officer or officers, with or without 
the name of the office held by the signer " 
Chnsttan v. Johnson, 556 S.W 2d 172, 173 
(Ky.Ct.App. 1977) Marshall has cited no 
authority for the proposition that a failure 
to identify Latham Exploration as Lexco's 
"program operator" on the document pre 
vented a transfer of marketable title3 We 
hold that the assignment at issue was suffi-
cient under Texas law to transfer Lexco's 
working interest to Boase 
The district court ruled for Marshall in 
the middle of the tnal when it determined 
that no further testimony was necessary 
because Lexco's assignment was invalid. 
Marshall asserts that it had additional de-
fenses to this action which were never 
presented because of the truncated nature 
of the proceedings In view of our holding 
that the Lexco assignment was effective, 
we remand for a new tnal. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
APPENDIX 
iuiemmm or OIL, GAS AJB KTMDUL LEASES 
: SXAlt OP TEXAS 
COURT OF IAJUUSOSI 
EBOH ALL KDf IT flDSE PUS0TS. 
James A Latham, General Partner 
That l . n m *i .? M l i r n r wnrt t M .Ky . whose address i s ^ , ? , ; ^ w > / ^ ~ 
_*U*. TTTf f t ! H t ! ? * * " — ™ - L4 71101 horele- f tOT a U W • a e e i g W 
to taw M t i a* tfca a i l , faa md a*nernl l a — • doeerihed W ) « , hereinafter 
celled "Seeject 1 " . 
aW 1 U M M I , far the consideration of 0>E •OWHED OOLLttS ($100.00) 
end ether good, nalnahle end adequate consideration, the receipt of which la 
i herehy echaovlsftgel hy Aeelgnor, the eaid Assignor does herehy g n a t , targala, 
• a l l and convey a l l at hie rights» t i t l e ami lntereet la the Subject I M M I 
hereinafter doscrihod to I . S. BOaft. « U « n a i l i n g eddraea i s Peat Office l ea 
S 3 , Carthage. Tnmee 75*33, hereinafter cal led "Aaalgpee". 
(1) 
Detet 
lecorded* 
(2) Lesaer 
Leaaee* 
Dace. 
Bocerded. 
Vlaataa Taylor at ux 
t, S. Bane* 
August 27. 1901 
Value* 946, Pag* **' 
Deed Becerda of Barrieon County, T«x. 
Travis Peak loyalty Corp. 
1. S. Baeec 
Septeuner 21, 19S1 
Valiant 944, Page 292 
Dead Records of Rarrleoo Conor?, Te* 
TVs Assignor unfcea no warranty regardiag the t i t l e to the assigned 
premises either in lav or equity, except that Assignor warrants against anyone 
aaaertlag aa eduerec d a l e of t i t l e te the Subject Ltases that arises hy, 
through, or under any act of Assignor, hut th i s Assignment i s node with trans-
. Many cases indicate that when a signer is not 
named in the granting clause, he is not bound 
by the conveyance For example, in Young \ 
Magee, 196 SW.2d 203 (Tex Civ App —Texar 
kana), aff'd 145 Tex 485, 198 S W 2d 883 (1946), 
a husband and wife attempted to convey proper 
ty owned jointly, and both signed the deed The 
husband, however, was not named as grantor 
The court held the document ineffective as a 
conveyance Id at 205 These cases are inap-
posite to the present case, because Lexco was 
properly named as grantor See Creosoted 
Wood Block Paving Company v McKay, 211 
SW 822 (Tex Civ .App— Dallas 1919) (deed 
naming as grantors "McKav and wife" was ef 
fective to convey wifes interest even though she 
was not designated by name in granting clause) 
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APPENDIX—Continued 
far and sutrofat ls* rights and actions af warranty which As signer may havt as 
to the iatareat eeslgfied. 
This lnstnaaant shall ac t int ing "son ano inure to the VenafU eJ Assignee 
and Assignee anal Chair respective hairs, successors and asalgne. 
.Jt, 
This laetriasent Is eaeceted this IT* day of Apri l , 19S4. 
> J, y^£? 
LEXCO SI-2 DXlLLlsC U0C1AH 
by James A. Lathaw, General Partner 
and INDIVIDUALLY , 
iv: y«^« y-Tr^u ••" :; l 
Lathait Exploration Coaptny, Inc. 
in Bankruptcy J>y Wi^ia» C.^anjJrS*, 
Truste "" ^  "* 
by: 'TJ^O 
James W. ROBERTSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ALEXANDER GRANT & COMPANY, 
etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 85-1542. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Sept. 2, 1986. 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc 
Denied Sept. 30, 1986. 
Former partner of accounting firm 
sued the firm and two of its partners, alleg-
ing that firm's refusal to pay him retire-
ment benefits violated ERISA. The United 
States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas, Robert W. Porter, J., en-
tered summary judgment for defendants, 
and former partner appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Robert Madden Hill, Circuit 
Judge, held that ERISA did not apply to 
retirement plan which covered only part-
ners. 
Affirmed. 
1. Pensions <s=>28 
ERISA did not apply to retirement 
plan which covered only partners. Employ-
ee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
§§ 101, 201, 301, 401, 505, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1021, 1051, 1081, 1101, 1135. 
2. Pensions e=>28 
Partnership's partners' retirement plan 
and principals' retirement plan were sepa-
rate plans, for purpose of determining ap-
plicability of ERISA to partners' plan, even 
though the plans were nearly identical, 
where plan covering partners did not pay 
any benefits to principals and plan covering 
principals did not pay any benefits to part-
ners. Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974, §§ 101, 201, 301, 401, 505, 
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021,1051,1081,1101,1135. 
William D. Harris, Jr., Richards, Harris, 
Medlock & Andrews, Daniel V. Thompson, 
Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant. 
G.R. Poehner, Morre & Peterson, William 
*\ LePage, Dallas, Tex., for defendants-ap-
pellees. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas. 
Before GARWOOD and ROBERT MAD-
DEN HILL, Circuit Judges, and MARTIN 
L.C. FELDMAN % District Judge. 
ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit 
Judge: 
We hold today that the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, is inapplicable to re-
tirement plans covering only partners and, 
accordingly, affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. 
* District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisi- ana, sitting by designation. 
1 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with 
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit 
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another 
shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that 
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been 
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have 
the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a 
party must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the 
particular case by the court in which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed 
in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted 
expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or proceeding, 
notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian and may have appeared by the 
guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any 
unknown party who might be a minor or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court must be 
appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the age 
of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor. 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the age 
of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the service of the summons, or if under that age 
or if the minor neglects so to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, 
or of any other party to the action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall 
be entitled to an order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for the minor 
defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after 
service of notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of 
such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or testamentary guardian located in the 
defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be 
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen 
years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service on the person with whom the 
minor resides. The guardian ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days 
after appointment in which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other party to 
the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more persons associated 
in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a 
corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of 
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such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained 
against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the same manner as if 
all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of 
an individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is 
named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is 
associated in and conducts business within the state of Utah in one or more places in that person's 
own name or a common trade name, and the business is conducted under the supervision of a 
manager, superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any action 
arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the term defendant 
shall include a respondent. 
History: Amended effective September 1,1991; April 1,1998. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph (d) has been changed to conform to the holding in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 
499 (Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated association to sue in its own name. The rule continues 
to allow an unincorporated association to be sued in its own name. The final sentence of paragraph (d) 
was added to confirm that the separate property of an individual member of an association may not be 
bound by the judgment unless the member is made a party. 
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the rule make the terminology gender neutral. In part (c) the 
word "minor" has replaced the word "infant," in order to maintain consistency with recent changes made in 
Rule 4(e)(2). In Rule 4 an infant is defined as a person under the age of 14 years, whereas the intent of 
Rule 17(c) is to include persons under the age of 18 years. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amendment added Subdivision (f). 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 17, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. - Guardians, § 75-5-101 et seq. 
Service of process, U.R.C.P. 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Associates. 
- Joint venture. 
Common name. 
Minors. 
- Action for injury of minor. 
- Control by court. 
- Failure to comply. 
-- Relief from judgment. 
Nonresident doing business in state. 
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- Not found. 
Real party in interest. 
- Assignee. 
- Corporation. 
~ Assignment of assets to another corporation. 
- Foreign corporation. 
-- Shareholder. 
- Divorce cases. 
- Insurance company. 
- Joint tort-feasors. 
- Partner in joint venture. 
- Purpose of rule. 
- Trust beneficiary. 
- Wife. 
- Wrongful death action. 
Cited. 
Associates. 
- Joint venture. 
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 
(Utah 1988). 
Common name. 
Banks that continued to run a shopping center after foreclosing on a loan to the developer could not 
be sued under the name of the shopping center, as the banks did not transact business or hold 
themselves out to the public under that name. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995), affd, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996). 
The name of a building owned by parties transacting business together, even if the business 
transactions related solely to the building, is not enough to establish that the parties were transacting 
business under the name of the building for purposes of this rule. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 
P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996) (affg 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
Although the two defendant banks transacted business together, including assuming title to property 
and entering leases with various tenants for portions of the property, where there was no evidence to 
show that the parties transacted business under the name accorded to their property, the "common name" 
provision in this rule did not apply. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996) (affg 895 
P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
Minors. 
- Action for injury of minor. 
Under this rule, mother as guardian ad litem for benefit of father could bring action for injuries to 
sixteen-year-old son where father, an immigrant, had a somewhat limited use of English and business 
matters were mainly handled by the mother; § 78-11-6 providing for suit by father was not exclusive 
remedy. Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P.2d 1177 (1971). 
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- Control by court. 
A guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Subdivision (b) is subject to the control of the court 
Skollingsberg v Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P 2d 1177 (1971) 
- Failure to comply. 
- Relief from judgment. 
The plea of infancy is a personal privilege which may be waived and, without a showing of fraud, 
collusion, or other substantial error going to the merits of the case, a minor defendant is not entitled to be 
relieved of the judgment against her on the basis of infancy Whitney v Walker, 25 Utah 2d 202, 479 P 2d 
469(1971) 
Nonresident doing business in state. 
- Not found. 
A nonresident who enters into contracts with entertainers who agree to perform at Utah schools in 
accordance with schedules arranged by him, and to collect for the performances, is not conducting 
business in Utah, either himself or through the entertainers, within meaning of this rule Alward v Green, 
122 Utah 35, 245 P 2d 855 (1952) 
Real party in interest. 
- Assignee. 
An assignee is the real party in interest Lynch v MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P 2d 464 (1962) 
- Corporation. 
-- Assignment of assets to another corporation. 
In action for alleged breach of loan agreement, dismissal of action on ground that plaintiff corporation 
was not real party in interest was error, since plaintiff corporation's assignment of all right, title and interest 
to all of its assets and unliquidated claims to another corporation did not include assignment of instant 
cause of action M & S Constr & Eng'g Co v Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139, 467 P 2d 410 
(1970) 
- Foreign corporation. 
The owner of a business is not precluded from enforcing a covenant not to compete merely because 
foreign corporation, disqualified from suing, may also have an interest in the contract and may incidentally 
derive an indirect benefit from the enforcement of the owner's rights Shaw v Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 
P 2d 745 (1952) 
-- Shareholder. 
Even though a shareholder owns all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a fact does 
not authorize him to sue as an individual for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation Norman v 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co , 596 P 2d 1028 (Utah 1979) 
- Divorce cases. 
Attorney's attempt to alter a divorce decree to provide that attorney's fees be paid directly to him was 
not a permissible procedure McDonald v McDonald, 866 P 2d 1253 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
(c)1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved 
5 
- Insurance company. 
Where purchaser of real estate was reimbursed by title insurance company for flaw in vendor's title, 
only insurance company, and not purchaser, was real party in interest entitled to bring action against 
vendor. Haueter v. Peguillan, 586 P.2d 403 (Utah 1978). 
- Joint tort-feasors. 
Joint tort-feasors, where liability is joint and severable, are neither indispensable nor necessary 
parties. Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962). 
- Partner in joint venture. 
In suit by partner in a joint venture against potential investors in the venture for interference with 
contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of agreement, the partner was 
required to either name the partnership as party in interest or join his partner as an indispensable party in 
interest. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). 
- Purpose of rule. 
A defendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest so that the 
judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another, and so that the defendant will be 
permitted to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the real owner of the cause. Shaw v. 
Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952). 
- Trust beneficiary. 
Although this rule clearly allows the trustee to sue on behalf of the beneficiary, it does not prevent the 
beneficiary from suing third parties directly. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
A trust beneficiary has standing to bring suit against third parties for the improper distribution of stock 
in the trust if he or she can show that the trustee improperly refused or neglected to bring an action 
against the third parties. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
- Wife. 
Where the husband sued to set aside a fraudulent transaction in which he had loaned $5000 to the 
defendant's corporation from funds in his business account in exchange for a note payable to husband 
and wife jointly, the wife was not an indispensable party plaintiff even though she replenished her 
husband's business account with their joint savings, since the false representations were made only to the 
husband and the wife took no other part in the transaction. Greenwell v. Duvall, 9 Utah 2d 89, 338 P.2d 
118(1959). 
- Wrongful death action. 
Because decedent's estate had no capacity to bring an action for wrongful death, the complaint was a 
nullity and there remained no cause of action in which to substitute parties; therefore, the trial court did not 
err in denying plaintiffs motion to substitute real parties in interest. Estate of Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984); Intermountain 
Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Empire Land Title, 
Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Mtg. Co., 797 P.2d 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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